United States v. LaTonja Spencer
787 F.3d 1153
7th Cir.2015Background
- Gwendolyn Jackson (president/co-owner of Chicago Global) and Latonja Spencer (loan officer) participated in a mortgage-fraud scheme (2004–2008) that used nominee buyers, false loan applications, and inflated sales to extract surplus proceeds; Bobbie Brown Jr. led the scheme.
- Jackson recruited nominees, supplied funds while concealing their true source, and caused lender losses of about $8.5 million; Spencer submitted or helped prepare false borrower information for 12 transactions, causing about $3.09 million in losses.
- Both were indicted (June 3, 2008) on fraud counts; tried jointly with codefendants and convicted on all counts charged.
- Sentences: Jackson—112 months and $8,515,570 restitution; Spencer—36 months and $3,091,050 restitution. Both appealed.
- On appeal, Jackson challenged exclusion of a November 2007 police report of Brown’s alleged domestic battery and the district court’s imposition of a two-level obstruction enhancement; Spencer argued the district court abused its discretion by denying severance and also challenged an obstruction enhancement.
Issues
| Issue | Jackson's Argument | Spencer's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Exclusion of evidence of Brown’s physical abuse | The excluded November 2007 police report and related evidence were necessary to corroborate her fear-based defense that she was unaware of the fraud | N/A | The court held the district court did not abuse discretion: the report was a post‑event incident occurring after the last offense and therefore properly excluded; Jackson nevertheless testified at trial about being intimidated and abusive behavior was admitted. |
| Severance of Spencer’s trial from codefendants | N/A | Spencer argued her defense was mutually antagonistic with codefendant Edgardo Hernal and warranted severance | Waived (no motion joined) and, alternatively, denial was not an abuse of discretion; mutually antagonistic defenses alone do not require severance. |
| Obstruction enhancement for perjury (Jackson) | Enhancement was improper because district court found she did not deliberately or knowingly lie at trial | Government argued testimony supported enhancement | Vacated as to Jackson: district court’s own finding that she did not deliberately lie negates the willful-intent element required for perjury; remanded for resentencing. |
| Obstruction enhancement for perjury (Spencer) | Adopted Jackson’s argument by reference | Government and district court found Spencer knowingly shaded the truth and intended to mislead | Affirmed as to Spencer: district court found she knowingly misrepresented facts, supporting the two-level enhancement. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Khan, 771 F.3d 367 (7th Cir. 2014) (standard for reviewing district court evidentiary rulings)
- United States v. Savage, 505 F.3d 754 (7th Cir. 2007) (post‑offense threats/evidence may be excluded when offered to support coercion/mental‑state defenses)
- United States v. Del Valle, 674 F.3d 696 (7th Cir. 2012) (standard for reviewing denial of severance)
- United States v. Plato, 629 F.3d 646 (7th Cir. 2010) (waiver for failure to renew severance motion at close of evidence)
- Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534 (1993) (severance required only if joint trial would compromise a specific trial right or prevent reliable jury verdict)
- United States v. Cheek, 740 F.3d 440 (7th Cir. 2014) (standard of review for obstruction‑of‑justice enhancements)
- United States v. Riney, 742 F.3d 785 (7th Cir. 2014) (perjury suffices for § 3C1.1 enhancement; elements required)
- United States v. Chychula, 757 F.3d 615 (7th Cir. 2014) (definition of perjury: false, material testimony with willful intent)
- Perez v. Illinois, 488 F.3d 773 (7th Cir. 2007) (perfunctory or undeveloped appellate arguments are waived)
