United States v. Lasseque
806 F.3d 618
1st Cir.2015Background
- On July 12, 2013, Rheau robbed a Bank of America branch in Barrington, RI, then returned to a Hyundai driven by Lasseque; police soon stopped the vehicle and Lasseque fled in a high-speed chase and on foot before being arrested. Officers recovered the stolen money, a gun, and robbery clothing from the car; Rheau later pleaded guilty and admitted Lasseque was the getaway driver.
- Lasseque waived Miranda and spoke with police post-arrest but was non-responsive and jocular; at trial he claimed he merely drove Rheau to retrieve items and did not know of the robbery or the gun.
- A jury acquitted Lasseque of aiding and abetting an armed bank robbery but convicted him of aiding and abetting a bank robbery (lesser-included) and conspiracy to commit bank robbery; he was sentenced to 140 months.
- At sentencing the district court applied a three-level weapon enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2) and a two-level obstruction enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1; Lasseque objected and appealed both the sufficiency of the evidence and the enhancements.
- The First Circuit reviewed the Rule 29 denial de novo (viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict) and reviewed sentencing enhancements for abuse of discretion (factual findings for clear error).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence for accomplice liability (aiding/abetting/conspiracy) | Government: circumstantial evidence (Rheau’s disguise likely donned in car, Lasseque drove and fled, post-arrest flight, Rheau’s admission) supports that Lasseque associated with and intended the robbery’s success | Lasseque: no prior knowledge of robbery or gun; claimed innocent errand and panic after learning of gun; insufficient direct proof of intent or affirmative act | Affirmed: jury could infer foreknowledge/intent from disguise, getaway driving, flight, and failure to dispute facts post-arrest — evidence sufficient for conviction |
| Weapon enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2) | Government: knowing participation in robbery made it reasonably foreseeable that a weapon would be used; guns are common in bank robberies | Lasseque: lacked actual knowledge of the gun before the stop; enhancement improper absent proof he knew of gun | Affirmed: foreseeability, not actual knowledge, controls; given awareness of plan, possession/brandishing of a weapon was reasonably foreseeable |
| Obstruction enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 for use of false affidavit at bail hearing | Government: Lasseque presented an affidavit from Rheau claiming Lasseque’s innocence; subsequent plea/admissions by Rheau rendered affidavit clearly false and it was used to influence bail | Lasseque: affidavit’s truth disputed; sentencing evidence not subject to cross-examination; court did not expressly find willfulness | Affirmed: sentencing court permissibly relied on reliable information; judge adequately found the affidavit false and that Lasseque willfully attempted to use it to obstruct the bail process |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Rosemond, 134 S. Ct. 1240 (2014) (accomplice liability requires knowing participation to ensure success of crime)
- United States v. Spinney, 65 F.3d 231 (1st Cir. 1995) (awareness of salient details of a plot supports accomplice liability)
- United States v. Matthews, 749 F.3d 99 (1st Cir. 2014) (weapon enhancement hinges on foreseeability to the defendant)
- United States v. Fermin, 771 F.3d 71 (1st Cir. 2014) (awareness of a general criminal plan permits inference weapons would be used)
- United States v. Greig, 717 F.3d 212 (1st Cir. 2013) (false statements at bail can support obstruction enhancement)
- United States v. Ransom, 990 F.2d 1011 (8th Cir. 1993) (insufficient sentencing finding where judge could not point to specific false grand jury testimony)
- Williams v. People of State of N.Y., 337 U.S. 241 (1949) (sentencing courts have broad discretion to consider varied information)