Background

• Rouillard was convicted of knowingly engaging in a sexual act with Reyes when Reyes was incapable of appraising the nature of the conduct or physically unable to decline participation, under 18 U.S.C. § 2242(2) and § 1153.
• On appeal, Rouillard challenges the district court’s refusal to give two proposed jury instructions and argues insufficiency of evidence; the court focuses on the jury instruction about § 2242(2).
• The May 29, 2010 incident occurred on the Santee Sioux Reservation in Nebraska; both parties are enrolled members of the Santee Sioux Nation.
• Prosecution presented Reyes’s testimony of memory gaps and physical indicators suggesting rape; Rouillard testified Reyes was awake and consented to sexual contact.
• The jury convicted Rouillard and the district court sentenced him to 30 months’ imprisonment and five years of supervised release.
• The district court read § 2242(2) as requiring knowledge that Rouillard was engaging in a sexual act and that Reyes was incapacitated, but Rouillard argued the knowledge element should include knowledge of Reyes’s incapacity.

Issues

Key Cases Cited

• United States v. Betone, 636 F.3d 384 (8th Cir. 2011) (discusses § 2242(2) knowledge elements)
• United States v. Riley, 183 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 1999) (sexual crimes against vulnerable victims; context of illegality)
• Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646 (Supreme Court 2009) (presumption that 'knowingly' applies to elements of a statute)
• Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (Supreme Court 1994) (need for mens rea generally applies to all elements unless Congress intent dictates otherwise)
• United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (Supreme Court 1994) (knowing mens rea generally required for criminal liability)
• United States v. Rehak, 589 F.3d 965 (8th Cir. 2009) (context can show variance in applying 'knowingly' to victim incapacity)