United States v. Larry Pust
798 F.3d 597
| 7th Cir. | 2015Background
- Pust was convicted of four counts of wire fraud after a jury trial.
- He and co-conspirator Robert Anderson ran a $10 million Ponzi scheme in the Chicago area through REI.
- Investors were promised funds would be held in an attorney escrow and used to secure lines of credit for a supposed low-income housing program, with guaranteed returns up to 20% monthly.
- No such low-income housing program existed; funds were diverted to pay old investors and to unrelated securities trading.
- Anderson pled guilty; Pust proceeded to trial and was indicted in December 2011 for wire fraud.
- Before trial, the government offered to admit Anderson’s statements under FRE 801(d)(2)(E) via a Santiago proffer; defense did not object.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of intent to defraud | Pust acted with intent to defraud through misrepresentations. | Pust was unwitting and believed the representations were true. | Sufficiency of evidence supports intent to defraud |
| Admissibility of co-conspirator statements | Statements of Anderson under 801(d)(2)(E) should be admitted as co-conspirator statements. | Admission was improper; waiver/forfeiture issues should be examined. | No reversible error; statements properly admitted; waived/forfeiture considerations discussed |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Paneras, 222 F.3d 406 (7th Cir. 2000) (sufficiency standard: rational finder could convict)
- United States v. Sheneman, 682 F.3d 623 (7th Cir. 2012) (elements of wire fraud require scheme, use of wires, and intent)
- United States v. Stephens, 421 F.3d 503 (7th Cir. 2005) (elements of wire fraud; intent to defraud defined)
- United States v. LeDonne, 21 F.3d 1418 (7th Cir. 1994) (circumstantial evidence can establish intent)
- United States v. Mahkimetas, 991 F.2d 379 (7th Cir. 1993) (existence of conspiracy shown by circumstantial evidence)
- United States v. Schumpert, 958 F.2d 770 (7th Cir. 1992) (defendant's involvement requires knowledge of conspiracy and intent to associate)
- United States v. Rea, 621 F.3d 595 (7th Cir. 2010) (abuse of discretion standard for co-conspirator statements)
- United States v. Yoon, 128 F.3d 515 (7th Cir. 1997) (rebuttal of co-conspirator statements challenge; sufficiency analog)
- United States v. Villasenor, 664 F.3d 673 (7th Cir. 2011) (standard for admitting co-conspirator statements under 801(d)(2)(E))
- United States v. Santiago, 582 F.2d 1128 (2d Cir. 1978) (Santiago proffer framework for admitting coconspirator statements)
