United States v. Laron Carter
907 F.3d 1199
9th Cir.2018Background
- Carter convicted on 14 counts for sex trafficking and interstate transportation of seven minor victims (2003–2013); sentenced to 40 years.
- Victim J.C. (Counts 13–14) lived in Minnesota and was seven months pregnant at trial; government moved to have her testify by live two‑way video or by Rule 15 deposition in Minnesota.
- District court allowed J.C. to testify via live two‑way video after finding she was unavailable to travel and that video would satisfy Confrontation Clause safeguards (oath, live cross‑examination, jury could view demeanor).
- J.C. identified Carter hesitantly on video and gave critical testimony that she was 16 when recruited, transported to Los Angeles, forced into prostitution, and controlled/coerced by Carter; documentary evidence supplemented her testimony.
- On appeal, Ninth Circuit held video testimony deprived Carter of his Sixth Amendment right to physical, face‑to‑face confrontation because the two‑part Craig necessity/reliability test was not satisfied given available alternatives (continuance, severance, Rule 15 deposition with Carter present).
- The court vacated convictions on Counts 13–14 as the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and remanded for resentencing on remaining convictions (Counts 1–12 affirmed).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether two‑way remote video testimony denies the Sixth Amendment right to face‑to‑face confrontation | Government: two‑way video preserved confrontation elements (oath, live cross, jury could view demeanor) so Confrontation Clause satisfied | Carter: remote testimony deprived him of literal face‑to‑face confrontation and attendant truth‑inducing effects | Two‑way video that prevents physical, in‑court face‑to‑face confrontation implicates the Confrontation Clause and is permissible only under Craig’s two‑part test |
| Whether Craig’s necessity requirement was met | Government: J.C. was unavailable to travel due to advanced pregnancy, justifying video | Carter: temporary pregnancy did not make physical confrontation unnecessary; alternatives existed | Necessity not shown—temporary pregnancy did not justify denying physical confrontation when continuance, severance, or Rule 15 deposition with Carter present were available |
| Whether the Confrontation Clause violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt | Government: other documentary evidence supported Counts 13–14; video testimony preserved many confrontation protections | Carter: J.C.’s live testimony was central and filled gaps documentary evidence could not (intent, coercion) | Error not harmless; J.C.’s testimony was critical and its remote admission could have altered the evidentiary picture—Counts 13–14 vacated |
| Sentencing impact from vacating Counts 13–14 | Government: (implicitly) uphold sentence | Carter: sentence based on counts that are vacated requires recalculation | Vacatur unbundles the sentencing package; remand for resentencing on remaining convictions |
Key Cases Cited
- Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990) (establishes two‑part test permitting non‑face‑to‑face testimony only when necessary to further an important public policy and reliability is otherwise assured)
- Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988) (Confrontation Clause guarantees face‑to‑face encounter; screens between defendant and witness violate that right absent exception)
- Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (Confrontation Clause is a procedural guarantee not coextensive with hearsay rules; reliability determinations do not replace confrontation requirements)
- United States v. Nguyen, 565 F.3d 668 (9th Cir. 2009) (standard of review for Confrontation Clause claims and preserving objections to avoid plain‑error review)