United States v. LaPant, 2:16-cv-01498

The United States sued Roger J. LaPant, Jr. and Goose Pond AG, Inc., alleging unauthorized discharges into waters of the United States in violation of the Clean Water Act and seeking injunctive relief and civil penalties.
Defendants moved to stay the district-court proceedings pending resolution of a related Ninth Circuit appeal, United States v. Robertson, which they expected would clarify CWA jurisdictional tests.
Defendants argued Robertson might overturn or otherwise alter the effect of United States v. Davis and the governing test from Justice Kennedy’s Rapanos concurrence as applied in N. Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburg.
The United States opposed a stay, arguing (1) the timing of Robertson’s final decision was uncertain and potentially distant, and (2) staying would impede the United States’ ability to obtain injunctive relief and mitigate ongoing or future harm.
The court considered the traditional factors for stays (possible harm from a stay, hardship to defendants, and whether a stay would simplify issues) and concluded defendants had not met their burden to justify a stay.
Instead of a stay, the court approved a revised discovery and trial scheduling plan (complete discovery by July 2018; trial-ready by May 2019) to accommodate potential effects of Robertson without halting the case.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether to stay the case pending the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Robertson	A stay is unwarranted because Robertson’s resolution is uncertain, could be distant, and delay would impede injunctive relief and mitigation	A stay is appropriate because Robertson may clarify CWA jurisdiction and could materially affect discovery, expert issues, and liability	Denied — defendants failed to show stay justified; scheduling adjustments ordered instead
Whether ongoing litigation costs alone justify a stay	Litigation costs do not justify a stay	Ongoing discovery and expense constitute hardship warranting a stay	Denied — costs alone are insufficient hardship under Landis/Lockyer
Whether potential simplification of issues from Robertson supports a stay	Does not outweigh harm from delay and uncertainty	Robertson could significantly narrow issues, especially expert discovery parameters	Denied — defendants’ assertions were generalized and unsupported; court favored modified schedule over stay

CMAX, Inc. v. Hall, 300 F.2d 265 (9th Cir. 1962) (district courts have inherent power to control docket and may stay cases to promote efficiency)
Leyva v. Certified Grocers of Cal., Ltd., 593 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1979) (stays may be entered pending resolution of independent proceedings bearing on the case)
Lockyer v. Mirant Corp., 398 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 2005) (defending a suit alone does not constitute a clear case of hardship to justify a stay)
Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (2009) (party requesting a stay bears the burden to justify it)
Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997) (stays are discretionary and burden rests on movant)
Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248 (1936) (stay standards; movant must show clear hardship or inequity)
United States v. Davis, 825 F.3d 1014 (9th Cir. 2016) (relevant Ninth Circuit precedent on CWA jurisdiction)
N. Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 496 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2007) (applied Justice Kennedy’s Rapanos concurrence as the CWA jurisdiction test)
Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006) (plurality and concurring opinions set competing tests for CWA jurisdiction)