United States v. Langhorne
ACM 39047
| A.F.C.C.A. | Dec 5, 2017Background
- Appellant, an Air Force member, conspired with SSgt Bailey to murder MC for money; they discussed arson and other methods, and Appellant set fire to MC’s inhabited dwelling in January 2014 while her children slept inside.
- Appellant received cash and gift cards from Bailey, purchased a propane torch, surveilled MC, provided a .22 pistol and suppressor, and participated in further planning; Bailey later cooperated with AFOSI.
- Appellant was tried by a general court-martial: convicted (contrary to pleas) of conspiracy to commit premeditated murder (two specs), aggravated arson (inhabited dwelling), and reckless endangerment (Article 134); pleaded guilty to steroid offenses; sentenced to dishonorable discharge, 12 years confinement, forfeitures, and reduction.
- AFOSI accessed Appellant’s Facebook messages using a username/password Appellant disclosed during monitored jail calls to a third party; Appellant moved to suppress these messages as a warrantless search.
- Defense sought to impeach Bailey with extrinsic evidence of prior lies and to admit character-for-helpfulness evidence for Appellant; military judge excluded extrinsic impeachment and refused the character evidence.
- Appellant raised multiple issues on appeal including Fourth Amendment challenges to searches of Facebook and his cell phone, impeachment and character-evidence rulings, preemption of Article 134 by Article 126, lesser-included instruction requests, and factual sufficiency of a conspiracy specification; the CAAF affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Warrantless access to Facebook messages | Accessing Facebook with the password obtained from monitored calls was an unlawful warrantless search violating the Fourth Amendment | Appellant voluntarily revealed username/password on recorded, monitored calls; no reasonable expectation of privacy remained | Court held no Fourth Amendment search — third-party doctrine + recorded call notice meant no reasonable privacy expectation; admission proper |
| 2. Impeachment by contradiction (extrinsic evidence of Bailey’s lies) | Defense needed to introduce extrinsic evidence to contradict Bailey’s denials to show untruthfulness | Military judge excluded under Mil. R. Evid. 608(b) as impermissible extrinsic proof of specific instances of conduct | Court held military judge did not abuse discretion: matters were collateral or foreclosed by admissions; impeachment by contradiction unavailable here |
| 3. Character-for-helpfulness evidence | Evidence that Appellant’s helpfulness showed intent to dissuade Bailey, not to further the murder plot | Prosecution viewed helpfulness as inconsistent with defense theory and irrelevant | Court held judge did not abuse discretion excluding it as not pertinent under Mil. R. Evid. 401/404(a)(2)(A) |
| 4. Preemption: Article 134 reckless endangerment vs Article 126 arson | Article 126 occupies the field for arson-related conduct so Article 134 is preempted | Article 134 (person-focused) contains elements (likely to cause death/grievous harm) different from Article 126 (property-focused) — no preemption | Court held Article 134 not preempted by Article 126; offenses address different societal concerns |
| 5. Lesser-included instruction (simple arson) | Defense asked for simple arson instruction as lesser-included of aggravated arson | Prosecution said inhabited-dwelling element undisputed so lesser not reasonably raised | Court held military judge correctly denied instruction because the distinguishing element (inhabited dwelling) was not in dispute |
| 6. Instructional and deliberation issues (conspiracy elements / member question) | Appellant later challenged the supplementary instruction given during deliberations | Defense counsel approved the proposed instruction at sidebar and on record | Court enforced the defense’s affirmative waiver and left instructional rulings intact |
| 7. Factual sufficiency — withdrawal from conspiracy | Appellant argued he withdrew based on conditional text stating he would not help unless things changed | Text was conditional and he later provided the weapon; he participated in overt acts | Court held evidence — including provision of the firearm — was sufficient; no effective withdrawal |
| 8. Post-trial/appellate delay | Appellant implied delay beyond Moreno thresholds | Court considered Moreno/Barker factors; Appellant did not show prejudice | Court found no due process violation and denied relief |
Key Cases Cited
- Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (Court applied reasonable expectation of privacy analysis)
- Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (third-party doctrine; no expectation of privacy in information voluntarily conveyed to third parties)
- United States v. Nieto, 76 M.J. 101 (standard of review for motions to suppress/admissibility reviewed for abuse of discretion)
- United States v. Moreno, 63 M.J. 129 (presumptively unreasonable post-trial delay; Barker factors framework)
- United States v. Anderson, 68 M.J. 378 (preemption doctrine requires congressional intent to occupy the field)
