United States v. Lang
78 F. Supp. 3d 830
N.D. Ill.2015Background
- Defendants Kevin Johnson and Tyler Lang indicted under the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act for conspiring to damage a mink farm and using facilities of interstate commerce to interfere with the farm’s operations.
- After the August 14, 2013 raid of Mink Farm A (release of ~2,000 mink; vandalism; caustic substances), Johnson and Lang were stopped the next day; law enforcement seized a vehicle containing items (acid, paint remover, bolt cutters, walkie-talkies, books about clandestine tactics) and two cell phones (Subjects 1 and 2).
- A search of Johnson’s phone (Subject Phone 1) showed extensive contact (≈800 interactions from June–mid‑August 2013) with Subject Phone 3 and listed the Subject Phone 3 number under the name “Tyler Lang.”
- The government applied under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) for historical cell-site location information (CSLI) and toll records for Subject Phone 3 for May 1–August 14, 2013; Lang objected, arguing Fourth Amendment protection and lack of relevance.
- The magistrate granted the § 2703(d) order: the court found Lang had no reasonable expectation of privacy in historical CSLI (third‑party/business‑records framework) and that the government showed specific and articulable facts that the records were relevant and material to the ongoing investigation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether historical CSLI is protected by the Fourth Amendment requiring a warrant | Gov: § 2703(d) suffices; CSLI is business records held by provider, not private information | Lang: CSLI reveals location; expectation of privacy exists; warrant required | Court: No reasonable expectation of privacy in historical CSLI; § 2703(d) order is permissible |
| Whether Jones (GPS trespass rule) requires a warrant for CSLI | Gov: Jones is about physical trespass and does not displace Smith/Miller third‑party doctrine | Lang: Jones signals reevaluation of third‑party doctrine in digital context | Court: Jones is inapposite; it turned on trespass, not third‑party records; Smith/Miller remain controlling |
| Whether the government met § 2703(d)’s "specific and articulable facts" standard | Gov: Phone linking, intensive contacts (≈800), timing before raid, and other evidence tie Lang to Subject Phone 3 and show relevance | Lang: Gov hasn’t shown Subject Phone 3 was used by Lang or that records are material | Court: Affidavit and corroborating facts linked Lang to Subject Phone 3 and demonstrated relevance/materiality; § 2703(d) satisfied |
| Whether toll records are separately protected or insufficiently shown relevant | Gov: Toll records corroborate contacts, identify associates, and show movements/purchases | Lang: Toll data from Subject Phone 1 already shows contacts; not necessary | Court: Toll records from Subject Phone 3 are relevant and material; corroboration and additional contacts justify disclosure |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (records voluntarily conveyed to third parties carry no Fourth Amendment protection)
- Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (pen‑register numbers dialed exposed to phone company are not protected by the Fourth Amendment)
- United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) (installing GPS on a vehicle and tracking it was a Fourth Amendment search due to physical trespass)
- In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600 (5th Cir. 2013) (historical CSLI treated as provider business records subject to § 2703(d))
- United States v. Guerrero, 768 F.3d 351 (5th Cir. 2014) (historical CSLI not protected by the Fourth Amendment)
- United States v. Rogers, 71 F. Supp. 3d 745 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (descriptive discussion of CSLI mechanics and application of third‑party doctrine)