United States v. Lamirand
2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 136
| 10th Cir. | 2012Background
- Lamirand pleaded guilty in 2003 to possession of marijuana with intent to distribute (Class D felony) and received 24 months' imprisonment followed by 5 years' supervised release.
- In 2010, Lamirand's supervised release was revoked for violations; he served 30 days in prison and received a new six-month term of supervised release.
- After release, Lamirand again violated supervised release, leading to a hearing on January 31, 2011 where he admitted violations and conceded revocation was required.
- Lamirand argued the court could not imprison him longer than the six-month term he was serving; the government contended the revocation statute authorized imprisonment up to the statutory maximum for the offense.
- The district court accepted the government's position and imposed a 12-month, 1-day prison term with no further supervised release; Lamirand appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 3583(e)(3) authorizes post-revocation imprisonment longer than the serving term | Lamirand argues the prison term cannot exceed the six months he was serving | Government argues imprisonment may exceed the serving term up to the statutory maximum for the offense | Yes; district court could impose up to the statutory maximum (two years) under § 3583(e)(3) |
| What serves as the reference point for the maximum post-revocation term under § 3583(e)(3) | Lamirand acknowledges the issue but offers no solid theory beyond the six-month limit | Government contends the reference point is the term authorized by statute for the offense of conviction, not the originally imposed term | The maximum is governed by the statute authorized term for the offense, not the original or second term imposed by the court |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Kelley, 359 F.3d 1302 (10th Cir. 2004) (revocation may impose prison time up to statutory limits under § 3583(e)(3))
- Palmer v. United States, 380 F.3d 395 (8th Cir. 2004) (post-revocation term limited by statute for the offense of conviction (pre/post-1994 context))
- United States v. Pla, 345 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2003) (language of § 3583(e)(3) ties post-revocation punishment to offense class)
- Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694 (2000) (analyzing § 3583(e)(3) at time of initial offense)
- United States v. Hernandez, 655 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2011) (aggregation issues under § 3583(e)(3) clarified post-amendment)