United States v. Lambus
897 F.3d 368
2d Cir.2018Background
- Lambus (a New York State parolee) and Fuller were investigated as leaders of a heroin trafficking organization; federal and state agents conducted a multi-year joint investigation beginning after Lambus's 2012 release.
- In May 2013 NYSDOCCS placed a GPS ankle monitor on Lambus as a parole condition; the device remained in place until his July 2015 arrest.
- State parole investigator Scanlon shared GPS data with federal agents (HSI/ICE, later DEA), and the agencies conducted surveillances, controlled buys, and five 2015 federal wiretaps.
- The first wiretap affidavit (Jan. 9, 2015) erroneously stated no prior wiretap applications existed for the listed targets; the error was corrected in later applications.
- District court suppressed (1) interceptions under the Jan. 9 wiretap, finding the affiant knowingly misled the judge and invoking supervisory power, and (2) GPS location data obtained directly from the ankle monitor, finding federal control of the monitoring and an unreasonable long-term search.
- Second Circuit reversed both suppressions: it held the wiretap error was not material under Franks and the record did not support intentional deceit; and it concluded GPS monitoring was reasonable in this parole-supervision context and suppression was not warranted.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (United States) | Defendant's Argument (Lambus/Fuller) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether January 9 wiretap evidence must be suppressed for misstatements/omissions in the affidavit | Affiant's erroneous statement about "no prior applications" was intentional or reckless and warrants suppression under Franks or the court's supervisory power | Error was inadvertent; even if intentional, omitted prior authorizations were immaterial to probable cause/necessity | Reversed: Franks governs; omissions were not material and district court clearly erred finding intentional perjury |
| Whether Title III §2518(10) exclusion applies because of the affidavit error | §2518(10) requires suppression for the misstatement here | Omitted prior authorizations did not render interceptions "unlawful" under §2518(10) because other statutory requirements were satisfied | Reversed: §2518(10) not triggered; Franks analysis controls suppression inquiry |
| Whether GPS ankle-monitor location data must be suppressed because federal agents used it without a warrant | GPS data was used by federal agents to generate evidence for prosecution; state-installed monitor became a stalking-horse for federal search and required federal authorization/warrant; long-term monitoring violated Fourth Amendment | Monitor was placed and continued pursuant to parole supervision; parolees have diminished privacy; state parole objectives justified monitoring and coordination with federal agents; no suppression warranted (and Davis good-faith rule would apply) | Reversed: monitoring was reasonably related to parole supervision; joint state-federal investigation permitted; suppression erroneous |
| Whether the district court could invoke inherent/supervisory power to exclude evidence despite Franks/Title III standards | Court may exclude to preserve judicial integrity where government conduct is willful or egregious | Non-egregious, careless error without materiality does not justify supervisory suppression | Reversed: supervisory suppression improper here absent a Franks-quality showing of intentional/reckless and material omissions |
Key Cases Cited
- Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (establishes standards for attacking a warrant affidavit for intentional or reckless falsehoods and materiality)
- United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413 (failure to comply with some Title III formalities does not automatically make an interception unlawful under §2518(10) when defects are non-central)
- Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (exclusionary rule may not apply where officers acted in objectively reasonable good-faith reliance on binding precedent)
- United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505 (Title III exclusionary principles and limits)
- United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (installation/use of GPS tracking constitutes a Fourth Amendment search)
- Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (probationers/parolees have significantly diminished expectations of privacy)
- Knights v. United States, 534 U.S. 112 (search conditions of supervised-release status are salient in Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis)
- United States v. Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. application of Franks to wiretap affidavit challenges)
- United States v. Reyes, 283 F.3d 446 (coordination between parole/probation officers and police does not automatically invalidate a parole search)
- United States v. Newton, 369 F.3d 659 (parole searches and cooperation with law enforcement can be reasonable when initiated for supervisory objectives)