United States v. Lamar Chapman, III, 763 F.3d 689

Thomas and Chapman were convicted of participating in a scheme run out of Chicago Abstract to defraud short‑term "transactional" real‑estate lenders by fabricating back‑end (B‑to‑C) sales and using proceeds from later lender closings to repay earlier lenders.
Thomas was convicted on eight counts of wire fraud and one count of aggravated identity theft for using real investor Oscar Corona’s identity on a fabricated sale that Corona never owned. Chapman was convicted on four counts of wire fraud.
The government’s proof relied on transaction documents (HUD‑1s, sale agreements), lender communications, AT&T phone records, testimony from victims, an FBI investigator, an auditor, and a cooperating co‑defendant (Orozco) who pleaded guilty.
Thomas contested only the aggravated identity theft conviction, arguing insufficient proof he filled out or used the falsified documents bearing Corona’s name. The court found circumstantial evidence (signature similarities, prior dealings, documents originating from Chicago Abstract, lender disbursement letters) sufficient to show knowing use.
Chapman argued identity was not proven because no witness made an in‑court identification of him, and he raised due process claims: (1) judicial estoppel based on the government dismissing co‑defendant Eddie Cox, and (2) an unspecified Brady claim for withheld exculpatory evidence. The court rejected both.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Sufficiency of evidence for aggravated identity theft (Thomas)	Gov: Circumstantial evidence (documents, lender letter, Corona’s testimony, origin at Chicago Abstract) shows Thomas knowingly used Corona’s identity.	Thomas: No direct proof he filled out or used the falsified documents.	Affirmed — circumstantial evidence was sufficient to prove knowing use.
Identity of defendant (Chapman)	Gov: Identity may be proved circumstantially (signatures, phone records, family testimony, counsel’s trial theory).	Chapman: No witness identified him in court as the Chapman involved; identity not established.	Affirmed — identity can be inferred from circumstantial evidence; in‑court ID not required.
Judicial estoppel based on dismissal of co‑defendant Cox (Chapman)	Chapman: Gov’s change regarding Cox should estop prosecution or otherwise prejudiced him.	Gov: No court adopted any prior inconsistent position about Cox; dropping Cox isn’t judicially estopping prosecution of others.	Rejected — estoppel elements not met; dismissal of Cox does not entitle Chapman relief.
Brady (withholding exculpatory evidence) (Chapman)	Chapman: Government must have favorable material (reasoning from Cox dismissal).	Gov: No specific withheld material identified; without showing particular suppressed evidence, Brady claim fails.	Rejected — no identifiable withheld evidence; Brady claim fails.

United States v. Chapman, 692 F.3d 822 (7th Cir. 2012) (standard for reviewing sufficiency of evidence on appeal)
United States v. Teague, 956 F.2d 1427 (7th Cir. 1992) (discussion of highly deferential sufficiency standard)
Flores‑Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646 (2009) (knowledge that identification belonged to another is an element of aggravated identity theft)
United States v. Spears, 729 F.3d 753 (7th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (name is a means of identification under §1028A)
United States v. Briscoe, 896 F.2d 1476 (7th Cir. 1990) (circumstantial evidence can establish elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt)
United States v. Prieto, 549 F.3d 513 (7th Cir. 2008) (identity may be proved circumstantially without in‑court identification)
United States v. Weed, 689 F.2d 752 (7th Cir. 1982) (upholding conviction despite lack of in‑court identification where circumstances tied defendant to offense)
Wells v. Coker, 707 F.3d 756 (7th Cir. 2013) (elements for judicial estoppel)
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecution’s obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence)