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United States v. Lahey
967 F. Supp. 2d 731
S.D.N.Y.
2013
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Background

  • ATF conducted an 18‑month undercover investigation of Pagans Outlaw Motorcycle Club; undercover agent infiltrated and reported members used, distributed, and guarded narcotics meetings.
  • Government charged five defendants, including Ezra Davis III and Walter Tarrats (the Moving Defendants), in an 11‑count superseding indictment; Count Eleven charged violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(h) (the "Bodyguard Statute") for knowingly possessing a firearm while "employed for" prohibited persons (felons/drug users) on May 22, 2010.
  • Allegations: at a Pagans gathering at Tracy Lahey’s property, defendants performed armed guard duty on behalf of Pagans officers and knowingly possessed a Hi‑Point 9mm rifle while on duty.
  • Moving Defendants moved to dismiss Count Eleven on statutory and constitutional grounds: they argued § 922(h) requires compensated employment; alternatively that the statute is unconstitutionally vague, infringes First Amendment association rights, and (for Davis) burdens Second Amendment rights.
  • The Court accepted indictment allegations as true for the motion and considered statutory language, legislative purpose, and precedent in denying the motions.

Issues

Issue Plaintiff's Argument Defendant's Argument Held
Statutory scope of "employed for" under § 922(h) Gov't: § 922(h) reaches individuals used as agents/substitutes for prohibited persons; no compensation required Davis/Tarrats: "Employed for" requires a demonstrable employer‑employee relationship with tangible compensation; indictment insufficient Court: "employed for" does not require pay; covers agents/substitutes; gov't must prove defendants were used as agents in course of employment
Vagueness / Due Process Gov't: statute provides adequate notice and scienter; application here is core prohibited conduct Defs: without compensation element statute is vague and allows arbitrary enforcement Court: as‑applied challenge fails — statutory terms (receive/possess/transport; knowledge) give fair notice; defendants’ alleged conduct falls within statute’s core; no arbitrary enforcement shown
First Amendment — Freedom of Association Gov't: § 922(h) targets employment/agency conduct, not mere association Davis: statute penalizes association because one cannot know membership will create criminal exposure; statute lacks requirement that defendant know he is being used Court: knowledge requirement interpreted to require defendant know employer is a prohibited person and that he is possessing a firearm in course of employment; statute does not punish mere association and is not overbroad
Second Amendment — Right to Bear Arms Gov't: § 922(h) is tailored to prevent felons from circumventing § 922(g) via proxies; substantial governmental interest in public safety Davis: statute may chill lawful carrying where others (prohibited persons) could use the firearm; burdens self‑defense Court: application here does not substantially burden core self‑defense right; even if heightened scrutiny applied, intermediate scrutiny satisfied — statute reasonably furthers important interest in disarming dangerous persons

Key Cases Cited

  • United States v. Weaver, 659 F.3d 353 (4th Cir. 2011) (analyzing § 922(h) scope and rejecting a strict compensation requirement)
  • Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010) (distinguishing vagueness and overbreadth; holding plaintiffs whose conduct is clearly proscribed cannot succeed on facial vagueness claim)
  • Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010) (due process vagueness standards for criminal statutes)
  • District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (Second Amendment protects individual right to possess firearms for self‑defense, but right is not unlimited)
  • McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (Second Amendment applies to the states; reaffirming Heller’s limits)
  • Flores‑Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646 (2009) (interpretation of "knowingly" scienter applying to statutory elements)
  • Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994) (mens rea: when regulated item is common and lawful, higher scienter may be required)
  • X‑Citement Video, Inc. v. United States, 513 U.S. 64 (1994) (reading scienter across statutory elements)
  • United States v. Farhane, 634 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 2011) (First Amendment overbreadth and vagueness analysis; statutes not penalizing mere association survive)
  • Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2012) (Second Amendment intermediate scrutiny framework for regulations outside home)
  • United States v. DeCastro, 682 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2012) (analysis of "substantial burden" and as‑applied vs facial challenges under Second Amendment)
  • United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010) (firearms statutes as part of broad regulatory scheme to keep guns from dangerous persons)
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Case Details

Case Name: United States v. Lahey
Court Name: District Court, S.D. New York
Date Published: Aug 8, 2013
Citation: 967 F. Supp. 2d 731
Docket Number: Case No. 10-CR-765 (KMK)
Court Abbreviation: S.D.N.Y.