813 F.3d 654
7th Cir.2016Background
- Harold Lacy pleaded guilty to one count of heroin distribution and entered a written plea agreement that included a broad waiver of appeal rights in exchange for the government's recommendations and cooperation benefits.
- The government agreed to recommend a low-end Guidelines sentence and to move for reduction for substantial assistance; the Guidelines low end (before the departure) was 188 months and the government recommended 168 months after a 10% departure.
- At sentencing, the prosecutor unexpectedly asked the district court, "as a courtesy" to a state prosecutor, to order Lacy’s federal sentence to run consecutive to any anticipated state sentence; the court accepted the recommendation and imposed 168 months consecutive to any state sentence.
- Lacy later received a 20-year state sentence on one state charge; he appealed the federal court’s imposition of a consecutive sentence as an abuse of discretion.
- The government argues the appeal is barred by Lacy’s broad, knowing and voluntary appeal waiver and that it did not breach the plea agreement; the district court’s discretion under Setser permitted consecutive sentencing but the court failed to explain § 3553(a) considerations for running consecutive to an undetermined state sentence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Lacy can appeal the consecutive-sentence decision despite his plea waiver | Waiver does not cover the consecutive/concurrent issue because the plea agreement is silent about it | Waiver is broad and unambiguous and bars any challenge to the sentence or how it was determined | Appeal barred by valid, broad waiver; appeal dismissed |
| Whether the government breached the plea agreement by requesting consecutive time | Request for consecutive sentence effectively increased total punishment beyond the parties’ expectations (arguing breach) | Government fulfilled promises: recommended low-end sentence and substantial-assistance motion; plea was silent on concurrency, so no promise was breached | No breach; plain-error review finds no reversible error |
| Whether there was a mutual mistake voiding the plea agreement | Parties were mistaken about the likely length/effect of future state sentence, so plea should be voided or modified | Argument waived (raised late) and legally insufficient because future uncertainty is not a mutual mistake of existing fact | Waived and meritless; not a mutual mistake of existing fact |
| Whether the district court properly exercised discretion in ordering consecutive time to an undetermined state sentence | (Implicit) Court abused discretion by basing concurrency on a courtesy to a state prosecutor without § 3553(a) explanation | District court had Setser authority to order consecutive time but should articulate § 3553(a) justification when state sentence is undetermined | Although discretion existed, the practice of imposing consecutive time as a courtesy is improper; court should explain § 3553(a) considerations — but this concern does not overcome the valid waiver |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Hallahan, 756 F.3d 962 (7th Cir. 2014) (plea-waiver interpretation and enforcement)
- United States v. Jones, 381 F.3d 615 (7th Cir. 2004) (enforceability of knowing, voluntary appeal waivers)
- United States v. Aslan, 644 F.3d 526 (7th Cir. 2011) (decision to impose consecutive sentence falls within a broad appeal waiver)
- United States v. Adkins, 743 F.3d 176 (7th Cir. 2014) (limits and due-process considerations for appeal waivers)
- United States v. Rachuy, 743 F.3d 205 (7th Cir. 2014) (plain-error review of sentencing issues)
- United States v. Goodwin, 717 F.3d 511 (7th Cir. 2013) (plain-error standard explained)
- Hurlow v. United States, 726 F.3d 958 (7th Cir. 2013) (contract principles govern plea agreements)
- United States v. Williams, 102 F.3d 923 (7th Cir. 1996) (parties’ rights limited to matters actually agreed upon)
- United States v. Cook, 406 F.3d 485 (7th Cir. 2005) (mutual mistake rescission principle applied to plea agreements)
