United States v. Lacy, 904 F.3d 889

Background

Defendant Daederick Lacy was tried and convicted on three felony counts: Count 1 (sex‑trafficking of a 16‑year‑old under 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1), (b)(2)), Count 2 (sex‑trafficking of a 19‑year‑old by force/fraud/coercion under § 1591(a)(1), (b)(1)), and Count 3 (transporting a 17‑year‑old with intent for sexual activity under 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a)). He received 293 months’ imprisonment.
Lacy challenged each conviction on appeal: Count 1 (jury not instructed with a technical definition of “sex act” and insufficient evidence that sex acts occurred); Count 2 (admission of hearsay testimony from officers recounting the 19‑year‑old’s statements); Count 3 (insufficient evidence that Lacy knew victim’s age, entered Texas, or had prostitution as a primary purpose of interstate transport).
On Count 1 the victim testified she engaged in sex acts arranged by Lacy; corroborating evidence included his arranging clients via online ads, his comments about condoms and oral sex, and the victim’s communications indicating she would travel to Dallas with him.
On Count 2 the 19‑year‑old testified she was homeless, Lacy seized her phone and car keys, took her to a hotel to meet a client, and she felt compelled to have sex; officers testified about the victim’s post‑incident statements (admitted without contemporaneous hearsay objection).
On Count 3 circumstantial evidence showed texts about leaving Kansas for more money, Lacy checking into a hotel, his cell phone pinged to a Mesquite, Texas hotel where the 17‑year‑old was found, and personal effects/documents tying Lacy to that hotel room/car.
The Tenth Circuit reviewed unpreserved jury‑instruction and hearsay objections for plain error, and insufficiency claims de novo, ultimately affirming all convictions.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Gov't)	Defendant's Argument (Lacy)	Held
Whether failure to give a technical definition of “sex act” in § 1591 requires reversal	No plain error; jury could find sex acts occurred from victim testimony and corroborating circumstantial evidence	Trial court erred by not instructing jury with § 2246 definition of “sexual act”; omission was plain error	Affirmed: no plain error; omission not clearly established law and evidence sufficed to prove sex acts
Sufficiency of evidence that 16‑yr‑old engaged in sex acts for Count 1	Victim’s testimony plus corroborating statements/inferences (e.g., condom/oral‑sex comment) proved sex acts beyond reasonable doubt	Victim’s testimony was conclusory and insufficient; required § 2246 definition to be met	Affirmed: viewing evidence favorably to govt, reasonable jury could find sex acts occurred
Admission of officers’ testimony recounting 19‑yr‑old’s out‑of‑court statements in Count 2	Any arguable hearsay error was not prejudicial; other strong evidence established coercion	Officers’ hearsay was inconsistent and stronger than trial testimony and thus prejudicial	Affirmed: plain‑error prong three fails (no reasonable probability outcome would differ)
Sufficiency of evidence for interstate‑transport offense (§ 2423(a)) (knowledge of minor’s age; travel to TX; purpose)	Govt need not prove defendant knew victim was under 18; circumstantial evidence (texts, phone ping, car, hotel room, Lacy’s income from pimping minors, intent to "stack and lay low") supports travel to TX and transporting minor for prostitution	Lacy: § 2423(a) requires knowledge of victim’s age; no direct proof he entered Texas; alternative explanations for phone/car/hotel; no proof prostitution was primary purpose	Affirmed: knowledge of age not required; circumstantial evidence supports inference Lacy went to Texas and one of his dominant purposes in transporting the 17‑yr‑old was to continue sex‑trafficking

Key Cases Cited

United States v. Pablo, 696 F.3d 1280 (10th Cir. 2012) (plain‑error standard explanation)
United States v. Cornelius, 696 F.3d 1307 (10th Cir. 2012) (standard for sufficiency review)
United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1 (1985) (plain‑error doctrine; sparing use)
United States v. Tavares, 705 F.3d 4 (1st Cir. 2013) (§ 2423(a) does not require knowledge of victim’s age)
United States v. Meacham, 115 F.3d 1488 (10th Cir. 1997) (interstate transport need not have illicit sex as sole purpose; illicit purpose can be a dominant purpose for transporting)
United States v. Magleby, 241 F.3d 1306 (10th Cir. 2001) (assessing prejudice from erroneously admitted evidence)
United States v. Hill, 786 F.3d 1254 (10th Cir. 2015) (permissible reliance on circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences)
United States v. X‑Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994) (scienter for age in child‑porn statute; distinguished)
Flores‑Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646 (2009) (contextual application of “knowingly,” distinguished)