791 F.3d 603
5th Cir.2015Background
- Kurt Mix, a BP engineer involved in estimating oil flow from the Macondo well after Deepwater Horizon, was charged with deleting text messages and emails; convicted of obstruction for deleting texts with his supervisor John Sprague and acquitted on another count.
- BP issued legal-hold notices and Mix deleted roughly 331 texts (about 17 unrecoverable); government contended deletion was to subvert a pending grand jury; Mix claimed accidental deletion of a photo.
- During jury deliberations the foreperson (Juror 1) overheard in a courthouse elevator that other BP employees were being prosecuted; she later told the jury she had heard something that made her more comfortable voting guilty but did not disclose the content when asked.
- Defense counsel improperly contacted jurors post-verdict and learned of Juror 1’s exposure; the district court held a hearing, found Juror 1 had been influenced and that her statement influenced the jury, and granted a new trial.
- The government appealed, arguing the extrinsic information was harmless, cumulative, cured by instructions, and that the evidence against Mix was overwhelming; the Fifth Circuit affirmed the new-trial order.
Issues
| Issue | Mix's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether juror exposure to extrinsic evidence (overheard that other BP employees were being prosecuted) required a new trial | Exposure likely prejudiced the juror by bolstering government theory and motive; warranted new trial | Harmless or cumulative; jurors instructed to disregard extrinsic information | Held for Mix: exposure was likely prejudicial and triggered presumption of prejudice |
| Whether Juror 1’s telling other jurors she’d overheard information (but not revealing content) was extrinsic influence | Such vouching is extrinsic even if content unrevealed and can influence deliberations | Not extrinsic or de minimis because content was not disclosed | Held for Mix: jury was prejudiced by foreperson’s statement and timing during deadlock suggested influence |
| Whether the government proved lack of prejudice (no reasonable possibility verdict was influenced) | N/A (burden on government once prejudice shown) | Claimed cumulative evidence, instructions cured prejudice, and weight of evidence made any influence harmless | Held for Mix: government failed to prove harmlessness; instructions and record did not cure influence |
| Whether court abused discretion by not explicitly applying Ruggiero three-factor test | N/A | District court erred by not analyzing content/manner/weight under Ruggiero | Held for Mix: government forfeited this argument; even on merits, factors do not show harmlessness |
Key Cases Cited
- Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966) (one juror’s exposure to extrinsic information can violate Sixth Amendment right to impartial jury)
- United States v. Smith, 354 F.3d 390 (5th Cir. 2003) (abuse-of-discretion review of juror outside-influence handling)
- United States v. Piazza, 647 F.3d 559 (5th Cir. 2011) (review standard for Rule 33 new-trial grants)
- United States v. Sylvester, 143 F.3d 923 (5th Cir. 1998) (defendant must show extrinsic influence likely caused prejudice)
- United States v. Davis, 393 F.3d 540 (5th Cir. 2004) (government must prove no reasonable possibility verdict was influenced)
- United States v. Ruggiero, 56 F.3d 647 (5th Cir. 1995) (three-factor test: content, manner, weight when assessing harmlessness of extrinsic influence)
- Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896) (permitting an Allen charge to a deadlocked jury)