United States v. Kukushkin, 61 F.4th 327

Background

Defendant Andrey Kukushkin was convicted after a jury trial in SDNY of (1) conspiring to make illegal political contributions by a foreign national (52 U.S.C. §§ 30121, 30122; 18 U.S.C. § 371) and (2) aiding and abetting over $25,000 in such contributions (52 U.S.C. § 30121; 18 U.S.C. § 2); he was sentenced to 1 year and 1 day and fined.
The government presented evidence that Kukushkin, representing Russian national Andrey Muraviev, coordinated with Lev Parnas and Igor Fruman to transfer about $1 million (≈ $150,000 used for 2018 political donations) through entities controlled by Parnas/Fruman to influence licensing for a cannabis venture.
Communications and documents (e.g., a "Cannabis Schedule and budget" chart) showed planning of donations to specific candidates/states and instructions to conceal Muraviev’s role and avoid making donations in his name.
Kukushkin requested three jury instructions: (A) a heightened willfulness instruction requiring knowledge of the specific FECA provisions violated; (B) an instruction explicitly restating that a co-conspirator must join with intent to violate federal election laws; and (C) a separate good-faith-defense instruction. The district court declined (A) and (C) and gave a standard willfulness and conspiracy-intent charge; it also declined to restate the conspiracy objective.
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed, holding FECA does not require a heightened willfulness standard, the conspiracy charge was adequate without restating the objective, and a separate good-faith instruction was not required because the willfulness/knowledge charge and a defense instruction conveyed the defense.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether FECA requires a heightened willfulness instruction (knowledge of the specific statutory provision)	Kukushkin: FECA is highly technical; conviction requires proof he knew the existence/meaning of the specific FECA provisions (Cheek-style standard).	Government: FECA is not that technical; Bryan standard (knowledge conduct is unlawful) suffices.	Affirmed for Government: standard willfulness instruction correct; FECA not highly technical so Cheek/Ratzlaf exceptions don't apply.
Whether court erred by not instructing that a co-conspirator must join with intent to achieve the conspiracy's unlawful objective (violation of federal election laws)	Kukushkin: jury should have been told he had to knowingly and willfully join with intent to violate federal election laws.	Government: the court properly instructed that conspirators must knowingly, willfully, and voluntarily join with intent to achieve the conspiracy's unlawful objective; no need to restate the objective.	Affirmed for Government: no error; restating the objective was not required.
Whether court erred by refusing a separate good-faith defense instruction	Kukushkin: he was entitled to a discrete good-faith instruction reflecting his defense.	Government: the willfulness/knowledge instructions and an instruction the defendant requested about lack of knowledge of unlawfulness conveyed the defense.	Affirmed for Government: no reversible error; the charge conveyed the essence of a good-faith defense.

Key Cases Cited

Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 (U.S. 1991) (tax-law willfulness exception: jury must find awareness of specific tax provision in some contexts)
Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (U.S. 1994) (structuring conviction requires knowledge that the conduct was unlawful)
Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184 (U.S. 1998) (willfulness requires knowledge that conduct is unlawful; specific-statute knowledge not generally required except in special technical statutes)
United States v. Smukler, 991 F.3d 472 (3d Cir. 2021) (applies Bryan; holds FECA not a highly technical statute)
United States v. Singh, 979 F.3d 697 (9th Cir. 2020) (applies Bryan to §30121; FECA not highly technical)
United States v. Benton, 890 F.3d 697 (8th Cir. 2018) (applies Bryan standard to campaign-finance offenses)
United States v. Kosinski, 976 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2020) (recognizes Bryan's definition of willfulness as generally applicable)