United States v. Krieger
2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 24900
| 7th Cir. | 2010Background
- Jennifer Krieger distributed fentanyl patches to Curry, who died from fentanyl toxicity in 2005.
- Krieger was charged in 2006 with distribution of fentanyl with death resulting, later superseded to non-death variant.
- At sentencing, the district court found by a preponderance that Curry's death resulted from Krieger's distribution, triggering a twenty-year mandatory minimum under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C).
- Krieger pleaded guilty to the superseding count, expressly not admitting that the patch caused Curry's death.
- The district court acknowledged its lack of discretion due to the mandatory minimum, and Krieger appealed, arguing death resulting is an element to be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
- The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding death resulting is a sentencing factor (not an element) that may be found by the court by a preponderance of the evidence, so long as sentence remains within statutory maximum.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Death resulting: element or sentencing factor under § 841? | Krieger: death resulting is an element to be charged and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. | United States: death resulting is a sentencing factor, not an element. | Death resulting is a sentencing factor, not an element. |
| Can death-resulting be proven by preponderance at sentencing? | If element, must be jury-tested; otherwise burden applies at trial. | Judge may determine sentencing factors by preponderance. | Yes; court may find death resulted by a preponderance at sentencing. |
| Sufficiency of evidence linking death to fentanyl under preponderance standard? | Evidence weak; main witness unavailable undermines causation. | Other experts corroborated; ample evidence supports causation. | Evidence sufficient to sustain finding by preponderance. |
| Conformity with Apprendi/Harris/O'Brien framework govern sentencing factor analysis? | McMillan should not constrain Apprendi; death result should be element. | Harris framework allows sentencing factors to be determined by judge. | Court follows current precedent: death resulting can be sentenced as a factor; still within Apprendi framework. |
Key Cases Cited
- Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (Supreme Court, 2000) (any fact increasing punishment beyond maximum must be jury-tried and proven beyond a reasonable doubt)
- Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (Supreme Court, 2002) (distinguishes elements vs. sentencing factors; minimums can be raised by judge with preponderance)
- McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (Supreme Court, 1986) (mandatory minimums do not affect maximum sentence; increase minimums within range)
- O'Brien v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2169 (Supreme Court, 2010) (distinguishes elements vs. sentencing factors; some factors must be charged and proven)
- United States v. Roberson, 474 F.3d 432 (7th Cir., 2007) (district court may not ignore mandatory minimums once death-resulting found)
- United States v. Duvall, 272 F.3d 825 (7th Cir., 2001) (post-Apprendi indictment should specify events used to raise max penalty)
- United States v. Krumwiede, 599 F.3d 785 (7th Cir., 2010) (standard for review of sentencing fact-findings is deferential)
- United States v. Martinez, 301 F.3d 860 (7th Cir., 2002) (841(b) drug-quantity provisions treated as sentencing factors)
- United States v. Bjorkman, 270 F.3d 482 (7th Cir., 2001) (84/1 pleading about elements vs. penalties in § 841)
- United States v. Brough, 243 F.3d 1078 (7th Cir., 2001) (treatment of § 841(b) elements vs. penalties; focus on sentencing factors)