United States v. Kramer, 631 F.3d 900

Kramer pleaded guilty to transporting a minor in interstate commerce with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity under 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a).
He admitted using a Motorola Motorazr V3 cellular phone to make voice calls and text messages to the victim during the six months preceding the offense.
The district court, over Kramer’s objection, treated the phone as a “computer” under 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1).
The district court applied the two-level enhancement for use of a computer to facilitate the offense under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 2G1.3(b)(3) (2009) and sentenced Kramer to 168 months; without the enhancement, the sentence would have been 140 months.
Kramer challenged (1) the classification of the phone as a computer and (2) the sufficiency of evidence that the phone met the statutory definition of a computer.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the sentence.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a basic cellular phone falls within the § 1030(e)(1) computer definition.	Kramer argues the phone is not a computer.	Kramer contends the statute excludes non-Internet devices.	Phone qualifies as a computer under 1030(e)(1).
Whether the government met the evidentiary burden to prove the phone was a computer.	Kramer asserts insufficient proof.	The government presented enough evidence to show processing functions.	Preponderance of evidence supported the phone as an electronic data processor.

U.S. v. Blankenship, 552 F.3d 703 (8th Cir. 2009) (standard of review for sentencing enhancements)
U.S. v. Kain, 589 F.3d 945 (8th Cir. 2009) (fact-finding standard for enhancements (clear error))
U.S. v. Lay, 583 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2009) (discusses computer use in relation to online/offline communications)
U.S. v. Mitra, 405 F.3d 492 (7th Cir. 2005) (statutory text interpretation of broad computer definition)