United States v. Kolwyck, 201600210

Appellant assaulted his wife in their on-base residence: multiple punches to the face (fractured left eye socket) and a choke/strangle maneuver while children were present.
At trial he pleaded guilty to two specifications under Article 128: (1) assault with intent to inflict grievous bodily harm (punching) and (2) assault with means or force likely to produce death or grievous bodily harm (strangling).
The military judge denied defense objections that charging both specifications constituted an unreasonable multiplication of charges.
The military judge sentenced the appellant to 14 months’ confinement and a bad-conduct discharge; the convening authority approved.
On appeal the court upheld the findings but concluded the two specifications should have been merged for sentencing because they arose from the same uninterrupted altercation, and the separate specifications unreasonably increased punitive exposure as applied to sentencing.
The Court of Criminal Appeals reassessed the sentence and, finding the adjudged punishment appropriate for the merged offense, affirmed the findings and the approved sentence.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether charging two assault specifications from one physical altercation unreasonably multiplied charges as to findings	Appellant: the two specifications arose from a single transaction and objected at trial	Government: punching and strangling are distinct criminal acts with separate risks and punishable separately	Court: No abuse of discretion — separate acts can support separate findings (findings affirmed)
Whether charging both specifications unreasonably multiplied charges as to sentencing (increasing punitive exposure)	Appellant: single uninterrupted incident should be treated as one offense for sentencing; separate specs exaggerated criminality and punishment	Government: different statutory subsections carry different maximums; separate crimes therefore justify aggregate exposure	Court: The two specs should have been merged for sentencing because they arose from the same act; separate maximums cannot be used to inflate sentencing exposure here; remedy is merger for sentencing and sentence reassessment (affirmed after reassessment)

United States v. Quiroz, 55 M.J. 334 (C.A.A.F. 2001) (sets out Quiroz five-factor test for unreasonable multiplication of charges)
United States v. Campbell, 71 M.J. 19 (C.A.A.F. 2012) (standard of review and discussion of remedy considerations)
United States v. Thomas, 74 M.J. 563 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2014) (consolidation/conditional dismissal remedy for unreasonable multiplication as to findings)
United States v. Winckelmann, 73 M.J. 11 (C.A.A.F. 2013) (guidance on appellate sentence reassessment and factors to consider)
United States v. Sales, 22 M.J. 305 (C.M.A. 1986) (reassessed sentence must be purged of error and appropriate to the offense)
United States v. Harris, 53 M.J. 86 (C.A.A.F. 2000) (standard for when reassessment is appropriate)
United States v. Lloyd, 69 M.J. 95 (C.A.A.F. 2010) (abuse of discretion standard in this context)
Jackson v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 569 (1957) (historic support for appellate sentence modification authority)