United States v. Kilcrease
2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 240
7th Cir.2012Background
- Kilcrease was arrested in Peoria with 174 grams of crack and 17 grams of heroin and charged with 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) with a § 851 enhancement for three prior felony drug offenses.
- In a written plea agreement Kilcrease agreed to cooperate for potential sentencing concessions, waived appellate rights, and the government reserved the right to request a sentence below the statutory minimum for substantial assistance.
- The government promised not to file additional charges, and Kilcrease was eligible for a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility.
- The district court conducted a Rule 11 colloquy, informing Kilcrease that a life sentence could be avoided only by a government motion for a reduced sentence based on substantial cooperation, and Kilcrease acknowledged understanding after a recess to confer with counsel.
- Eight months later Kilcrease moved pro se to withdraw the plea; after substituting counsel, he withdrew the motion.
- At sentencing the government refused to move under § 3553(e) for a sentence below the minimum; Kilcrease had cooperated but offered little usable cooperation, and the court imposed life imprisonment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is the appellate waiver enforceable? | Kilcrease asserts the plea is void and waiver unenforceable. | Government argues waiver is valid if the plea agreement is valid and knowingly entered. | Appellate waiver enforceable; dismissal follows from valid plea and waiver. |
| Did the government’s promise constitute valid consideration for the guilty plea? | Kilcrease claims the discretionary § 3553(e) motion renderered the promise illusory. | The government’s good-faith evaluation of cooperation provides consideration. | Yes; consideration exists because government must evaluate cooperation in good faith. |
| Did Kilcrease knowingly enter the guilty plea? | Kilcrease claims he did not understand the government’s sole-discretion motion. | Record shows Kilcrease understood after recess and repeatedly affirmed understanding. | Yes; the plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered. |
| Was there an adequate factual basis for the plea? | Kilcrease contends lack of explicit intent to distribute was defect. | Admission of distribution intent was proven by the quantity and Kilcrease’s statements. | Yes; sufficient factual basis existed under Rule 11(b)(3). |
| Did the government breach § 3553(e) by not moving for a sentence reduction? | Kilcrease claims breach due to failure to move for substantial assistance. | Agency discretion in deciding motions is not reviewable absent improper motive or irrational reasoning. | No actionable breach; decision to forego a § 3553(e) motion stands unrevealed of improper motive. |
Key Cases Cited
- Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181 (1992) (prosecutorial discretion in cooperation-related decisions permissible)
- United States v. Billings, 546 F.3d 472 (7th Cir. 2008) (cooperation consideration supports plea agreement)
- United States v. Emerson, 349 F.3d 986 (7th Cir. 2003) (government retains discretion in cooperation-based matters)
- United States v. Isaac, 141 F.3d 477 (3d Cir. 1998) (good-faith consideration of substantial-assistance motion supports plea)
- United States v. Chapa, 602 F.3d 865 (7th Cir. 2010) (appellate waivers require knowing and voluntary entry)
- United States v. Sakellarion, 649 F.3d 634 (7th Cir. 2011) (enforceability of plea agreements with waivers)
- United States v. Quintero, 618 F.3d 746 (7th Cir. 2010) (colloquy must reasonably assure understanding of consequences)
- United States v. White, 597 F.3d 863 (7th Cir. 2010) (knowing and voluntary plea when court ensures understanding)