United States v. Khalid Hamdan
910 F.3d 351
| 7th Cir. | 2018Background
- Khalid Hamdan was arrested after an October 2014 traffic stop; searches of linked storage units uncovered ~20,000 packages of the synthetic cannabinoid “spice,” manufacturing supplies, ledgers, and $67,000 in cash. He was indicted on two counts of possession with intent to distribute and one count of conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 & 846.
- Hamdan’s defense was that he lacked the required mens rea because he honestly believed the synthetic cannabinoids he handled were legal; he intended to show prior interactions where other jurisdictions didn’t prosecute him for different synthetic cannabinoids (Illinois 2011; Wisconsin 2012).
- Hamdan subpoenaed two Wisconsin state troopers from the 2012 arrest to testify about their unfamiliarity with the substance found then; the government moved to quash and sought exclusion of evidence that spice had been treated as legal previously or that prior prosecutions were declined.
- The district court excluded evidence of prior non-prosecution and that spice was previously “legal,” reasoning prior non-prosecution does not prove a defendant’s belief about legality and noting XLR-11 was an analogue since 2011; the court quashed the trooper subpoenas as irrelevant and likely to confuse the jury.
- At trial the government introduced circumstantial evidence of Hamdan’s knowledge (storage unit control, ledgers, lookouts, cash payments, fingerprints on packages); a jury convicted Hamdan on all three counts. Post-trial, the district court denied Hamdan’s Rule 33 motion for a new trial.
Issues
| Issue | Hamdan's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether quashing subpoenas of Wisconsin troopers was an abuse of discretion | Troopers’ testimony would show even law enforcement was uncertain about legality of synthetic cannabinoids in 2012, supporting Hamdan’s lack-of-knowledge defense in 2014 | Troopers’ testimony about a different substance years earlier was irrelevant to Hamdan’s 2014 mental state and would confuse/jurors and be prejudicial | Quash not an abuse: testimony was too remote, about a different compound, and risked confusion/prejudice |
| Whether excluding evidence of prior non-prosecution and prior “legal” status deprived Hamdan of right to present a defense / justified a new trial | Exclusion prevented him from negating the knowledge element and forced choice between testifying and presenting his theory | Prior non-prosecution and labels of “legal” are not probative of defendant’s 2014 belief; court left room to present other evidence of belief | No abuse: court permitted presentation of belief-based evidence and did not bar his defense; Rule 33 denied |
Key Cases Cited
- McFadden v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2298 (Sup. Ct. 2015) (knowledge element can be proven by awareness that a substance is controlled or by knowing the substance’s identity)
- Mire, 725 F.3d 665 (7th Cir. 2013) (government may prove knowledge via circumstantial evidence that defendant knew the substance was illegal)
- Ozuna, 561 F.3d 728 (7th Cir. 2009) (district court may exclude collateral or irrelevant evidence when its risk of confusing the jury substantially outweighs probative value)