917 F.3d 177
3rd Cir.2019Background
- Kevin L. Reese was indicted for six counts of wire fraud and six counts of aggravated identity theft; trial originally scheduled March 7, 2016 and after several agreed continuances was set for October 24, 2016.
- The District Court sua sponte rescheduled trial twice: October 12, 2016 (stated ends-of-justice exclusion) and November 10, 2016 (rescheduled trial to Feb 22, 2017) without citing the Speedy Trial Act or making factual findings justifying an exclusion.
- At the time of the November 10 order, roughly 50 days of the 70‑day Speedy Trial Act clock had already run; the November continuance added at least 71 unexcluded days, pushing total unexcluded delay beyond 70 days.
- Reese moved to dismiss under the Speedy Trial Act before trial; the District Court denied the motion, citing defendant’s counsel’s acquiescence and analogizing to precedent allowing counsel‑requested continuances.
- Jury convicted Reese on all counts and he appealed; the Third Circuit limited its review to the Speedy Trial Act claim and whether the November continuance validly excluded time.
Issues
| Issue | Reese's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the November 10, 2016 sua sponte continuance validly excluded time under the Speedy Trial Act | The continuance did not invoke the Act nor make required factual findings; therefore the delay was not excluded and the 70‑day limit was exceeded | The continuance was effectively made "in consultation with" defense counsel at the pretrial conference and counsel did not object, so time should be excluded | Held for Reese: the order neither invoked the Act nor made the required balancing/findings, so the delay was not excluded and the 70‑day limit was exceeded |
| Whether Reese waived his Speedy Trial Act claim by failing to object earlier or by not specifying particular periods of delay | A timely motion to dismiss apprised the court that the 70‑day limit had expired; that was sufficient to preserve the claim because the unexcluded days plainly exceeded 70 | Government argued defendant’s non‑objection and counsel’s acquiescence preclude relief; suggested waiver doctrine should apply | Held for Reese: waiver doctrine did not bar appeal here; a basic timely motion sufficed where the record showed the 70‑day limit had been exceeded |
| Appropriate remedy for Speedy Trial Act violation | Dismissal of the indictment under the Act; district court to decide prejudice/dismissal with or without prejudice | Government urged other doctrines (waiver, harmlessness) or that prejudice must be shown | Held for Reese: conviction vacated and case remanded to district court to dismiss the indictment under 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2), which court must decide whether dismissal is with or without prejudice |
Key Cases Cited
- Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489 (2006) (Speedy Trial Act requires court to place ends‑of‑justice findings on the record by the time it rules on a dismissal motion; defendants cannot prospectively waive Act protections)
- Bloate v. United States, 559 U.S. 196 (2010) (distinguishes automatic and court‑invoked statutory exclusions under the Act)
- United States v. Brooks, 697 F.2d 517 (3d Cir. 1982) (form continuance plus later factual supplementation can satisfy Act’s record requirement)
- United States v. Rivera Construction Co., 863 F.2d 293 (3d Cir. 1988) (record must show the court balanced public and defendant interests when ordering an ends‑of‑justice continuance)
- United States v. Brenna, 878 F.2d 117 (3d Cir. 1989) (an ends‑of‑justice continuance cannot be applied nunc pro tunc; courts cannot exclude time in hindsight)
- United States v. Herbst, 666 F.3d 504 (8th Cir. 2012) (discussed by district court regarding counsel‑requested continuances; distinguishable here because continuance was court‑initiated)