United States v. Kevin Price
841 F.3d 703
| 6th Cir. | 2016Background
- Police obtained a warrant to search Kevin Price’s home based on multiple informants and a recent tip from an arrested dealer identifying Price as his heroin supplier; officers also knew Price’s vehicle descriptions and his six prior drug convictions.
- Surveillance units positioned near Price’s house observed Price briefly lean into a parked Tahoe—conduct an officer reasonably believed was a hand-to-hand drug transaction—and the Tahoe then drove off.
- Price walked into an alley behind his house where an officer in that alley positively identified him; he then got into a truck and drove away, prompting officers to stop, gunpoint-detain, and handcuff him at a nearby intersection.
- Officers searched Price’s home and found drug paraphernalia and rental records for storage units; no drugs were found in the house.
- About three hours after his arrest, officers located Price’s van at a storage facility; after being told about the van, Price admitted it was his and consented to a search, which uncovered firearms and cocaine.
- Price was indicted for being a felon in possession of firearms; he moved to suppress the evidence (arguing an unlawful arrest invalidated his later consent) and separately moved for return of property; the district court denied both motions and convicted/sentenced him, and Price appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Price’s Argument | Government’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether officers had probable cause to arrest Price at the intersection | Arrest lacked probable cause; detention was unlawful, so later consent was invalid | Officers had reasonable suspicion from tips plus observed hand-to-hand transaction and flight, which together gave probable cause | Probable cause existed; arrest lawful; suppression denied |
| Whether Price’s post-arrest consent to search the van was voluntary and valid | Consent tainted by unlawful arrest and thus invalid | Valid consent given after lawful arrest and independent of search warrant process | Consent valid; evidence admissible |
| Whether the district court erred denying Rule 41(g) return-of-property motion | Federal court should order return of seized property | Property was seized and disposed of by state/local officers; federal government never possessed it | Denial affirmed because federal possession never occurred |
| Standard of review for suppression factual findings | N/A (procedural) | N/A | District court’s factual findings reviewed for clear error; legal conclusions reviewed de novo |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Winters, 782 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 2015) (standard of review for suppression rulings)
- Radvansky v. City of Olmstead Falls, 496 F.3d 609 (6th Cir. 2007) (probable cause requires facts that would lead a prudent person to believe a crime occurred)
- Weaver v. Shadoan, 340 F.3d 398 (6th Cir. 2003) (flight after police suspicion can supply probable cause)
- United States v. Stepp, 680 F.3d 651 (6th Cir. 2012) (defendant’s narcotics convictions can inform officers’ reasonable suspicion)
- Savoy v. United States, 604 F.3d 929 (6th Cir. 2010) (standard of review for Rule 41(g) motions)
- Okoro v. Callaghan, 324 F.3d 488 (7th Cir. 2003) (Rule 41(g) requires that the federal government have possessed the property)
