United States v. Kenneth Mullins
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 17844
| 7th Cir. | 2015Background
- In May 2013 Deputy Kyle Boomer submitted an affidavit seeking a warrant to search Kenneth Mullins’s apartment (#2), alleging Mullins and Terrance Washington used it as a stash house for cocaine and marijuana.
- The affidavit relied heavily on a confidential informant (CI) who identified Washington (“T”), described a black Cadillac Escalade with Minnesota plate 161EKT, and said drugs were kept in the apartment; officers corroborated the vehicle and saw short 3–4 minute buyer visits.
- Officers conducted a controlled buy during the week of May 12, 2013: the CI (after being searched and provided funds) arranged the buy, the officers observed a hand-to-hand transaction at a Family Dollar, followed the CI to deliver marijuana to police, and traced the seller back to the Escalade and apartment.
- A warrant issued; execution recovered large quantities of marijuana, crack, powder cocaine, drug paraphernalia, and mail addressed to Mullins. Mullins and Washington were indicted on federal drug charges.
- Mullins moved to suppress and requested a Franks hearing, arguing the affidavit contained factual inaccuracies (surveillance attribution, the CI’s phone contact was with an intermediary not T, and a false claim that Boomer relied on police reports). The district court denied suppression and a Franks hearing; Mullins pleaded guilty but reserved this appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Mullins’ Argument | Government’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether affidavit contained false statements/omissions material to probable cause (Franks materiality) | Boomer’s inaccuracies (who surveilled CI/apartment, CI spoke to intermediary, claim of police reports) undermined probable cause and warrant validity | The inaccuracies were immaterial because officers’ corroboration and controlled buy independently established probable cause | Denied Franks hearing; inaccuracies not material to probable cause |
| Whether CI’s reliability/basis of knowledge was sufficiently established to support probable cause | CI lacked shown firsthand knowledge of drugs in the apartment, so tip alone was insufficient | CI provided detailed information corroborated by officer surveillance and a controlled buy, satisfying Gates/Sutton factors | Probable cause established under totality of circumstances |
Key Cases Cited
- Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) (establishes right to evidentiary hearing when affidavit contains intentional or reckless falsehoods material to probable cause)
- Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (probable cause assessed under totality of the circumstances)
- United States v. Sutton, 742 F.3d 770 (7th Cir.) (factors to assess informant reliability: firsthand knowledge, detail, police corroboration, time interval)
- United States v. Peck, 317 F.3d 754 (7th Cir.) (informant tip lacking firsthand basis and corroboration may be insufficient)
- United States v. McMurtrey, 704 F.3d 502 (7th Cir.) (inconsistencies can be material when correcting them eradicates probable cause)
- United States v. Gilbert, 45 F.3d 1163 (7th Cir.) (informant reliability may be shown by independent police corroboration)
- United States v. McKinney, 143 F.3d 325 (7th Cir.) (controlled buys strongly bolster informant tips)
- United States v. Reddrick, 90 F.3d 1276 (7th Cir.) (controlled buys plus informant info can support probable cause)
- United States v. Orozco, 576 F.3d 745 (7th Cir.) (probable cause standard for searching a drug dealer’s home)
- United States v. Glover, 755 F.3d 811 (7th Cir.) (Franks hearing warranted where warrant relied almost entirely on an uncorroborated informant)
- United States v. Bell, 585 F.3d 1045 (7th Cir.) (warrant deficient where officers omitted critical CI credibility/track-record information)
- United States v. Robinson, 546 F.3d 884 (7th Cir.) (standard of review and Franks applicability to omissions)
- United States v. Harris, 464 F.3d 733 (7th Cir.) (Franks applies to omissions; materiality test)
- United States v. Williams, 718 F.3d 644 (7th Cir.) (Franks preliminary showing requirements)
