64 F.4th 207
4th Cir.2023Background
- Wysinger supplied heroin/fentanyl to drug-addicted women, then required them to prostitute themselves to repay debts; scheme operated across VA, WV, and MD.
- On March 23, 2016, Wysinger provided fentanyl to two women; one died (Count 3), the other survived and testified (Counts 1–4). Co-defendant Leslee Garza (Wysinger’s partner) also died of an overdose and did not testify.
- A 23-witness prosecution case included victim testimony and experts on addiction and commercial sex trafficking explaining debt-bondage via drug dependence.
- Jury convictions: (1) conspiracy to commit sex trafficking, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591(a)(1), 1594(c); (2) interstate transportation for prostitution, 18 U.S.C. § 2421; (3) distribution/possession with intent to distribute fentanyl resulting in death, 21 U.S.C. § 841; (4) distribution/possession with intent resulting in serious bodily injury, 21 U.S.C. § 841.
- At sentencing the district court found a prior felony drug conviction, triggering mandatory life on Counts 3 and 4 under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C); Wysinger received life on Counts 1, 3, 4 and 120 months on Count 2 (concurrent). Wysinger appealed; the Fourth Circuit affirmed in full.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Gov't) | Defendant's Argument (Wysinger) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence that Wysinger conspired to use coercion under §1591 | Evidence (victim testimony, experts) established a scheme exploiting addiction (fronting drugs, taking earnings) to coerce prostitution | Relationship was voluntary/collaborative: no violence, victims had prior prostitution histories and other suppliers, some moved freely | Affirmed — viewing evidence in gov't favor, jury reasonably found intent to coerce; appellate court will not reweigh credibility |
| Whether co-conspirator Garza shared intent | Circumstantial evidence (lived together, posted ads, drove victims, knew Wysinger collected money and supplied drugs) supports inference of agreement | Garza lacked criminal intent; died so did not testify | Affirmed — agreement may be inferred from circumstantial evidence; jury could find Garza knowingly participated |
| Jury instruction on §1591 mental state (knowledge vs. reckless disregard re: “advertising”) | Indictment charged recruiting/harboring/etc., not advertising; statute allows knowledge or reckless-disregard where advertising is not charged | Because indictment referenced advertising, jury should need to find knowledge (not mere recklessness) | Affirmed — no plain error; instruction properly allowed conviction on knowledge or reckless disregard because advertising was not the charged statutory basis |
| Counts 3–4: whether §841(b)(1)(C) enhanced penalty requires actual distribution (vs. possession with intent) or was duplicitous | Enhanced penalty applies when death/serious injury "results from the use of such substance," regardless of whether the offense was distribution or possession with intent; duplicity objection was forfeited | §841(b)(1)(C) requires that defendant actually distributed the drug to the victim; indictment duplicitous for charging both distribution and possession-with-intent in same count | Affirmed — instruction correct: enhancement focuses on death resulting from use; duplicity objection forfeited for failure to raise pretrial |
| Whether prior VA §18.2-248 conviction qualifies as a "felony drug offense" under 21 U.S.C. § 802(44) (federal vs. state definitions; categorical match) | §802(44) uses defined federal terms (narcotic, marihuana, anabolic steroid, depressant/stimulant); compare prior offense elements to those federal definitions | Virginia schedules are overbroad/differ from federal definitions (e.g., isomer language), so prior conviction may not categorically match §802(44) | Affirmed — Court applies Section 802 definitions, finds no plain error in treating the VA conviction as a qualifying felony drug offense; Wysinger’s isomer arguments fail to show plain error |
| Career-offender enhancement validity and sentencing effect | Even without career-offender designation, statutory life and Guidelines exposure support life sentence | Challenges career-offender application | Harmless error — any error in applying career-offender status had no effect because mandatory life applied via §841(b)(1)(C) and Guidelines life would still obtain |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Mack, 808 F.3d 1074 (6th Cir. 2015) (upholding §1591 conviction where defendant exploited addicts to force prostitution)
- Smith v. United States, 568 U.S. 106 (2013) (conspiracy requires agreement of two or more persons)
- Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204 (2014) (§841(b)(1)(C) requires that death or serious bodily injury "result from" the use of the drug)
- United States v. Ward, 972 F.3d 364 (4th Cir. 2020) (discussing "controlled substance" scope under the Guidelines)
- United States v. Ruth, 966 F.3d 642 (7th Cir. 2020) (addressing statutory definitions and isomer language in state statute)
- United States v. Cucalon, 958 F.3d 245 (4th Cir. 2020) (analyzing divisibility of Va. Code § 18.2-248)
- United States v. Jeffries, 958 F.3d 517 (6th Cir. 2020) (interpretation of §841(b)(1)(C) application)
- United States v. Hargrove, 701 F.3d 156 (4th Cir. 2012) (harmless sentencing-error standard)
- Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129 (2009) (clarifying "plain error" review)
- Coleman v. Johnson, 566 U.S. 650 (2012) (the jury, not the appellate court, resolves credibility conflicts)