United States v. Keenan Quinn
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 16822
| 3rd Cir. | 2013Background
- Quinn drove codefendant Shawn Johnson to a bank on the morning of an armed robbery; Johnson committed the robbery at gunpoint and was later arrested with Quinn; both were indicted for bank robbery and related firearm offenses.
- Johnson pleaded guilty and was awaiting sentencing when Quinn’s trial was scheduled; Johnson told police Quinn was not involved but said little else and had a familial tie to Quinn.
- Quinn sought to have the district court immunize Johnson so Johnson could testify that Quinn was unaware of the robbery; the District Court denied the request and Johnson invoked the Fifth Amendment at trial.
- At trial the Government presented phone records, deleted-call evidence, and testimony from two cellmates that supported Quinn’s knowing participation; Quinn testified but was convicted by a jury and sentenced.
- On appeal, Quinn argued the district court erred by refusing to immunize Johnson and (for the first time) that the Government engaged in prosecutorial misconduct by delaying Johnson’s sentencing to induce invocation of the Fifth Amendment.
- The Third Circuit reconsidered its prior authority (from Government of the Virgin Islands v. Smith) to permit district courts to grant "judicial use immunity," abolished that remedial power, retained Smith’s five-part test as a due-process/prosecutorial-misconduct framework, and affirmed Quinn’s conviction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a district court may grant judicial use immunity to a defense witness | Quinn: District court could immunize Johnson under Smith so he would testify and allow an effective defense | Gov: Only Executive (AG/DOJ) may grant statutory use immunity under 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002–6003; courts lack authority | Court: Rejects judicial use immunity; immunity is statutory and belongs to Executive; Smith’s remedial holding overturned |
| Whether Smith’s five-part test remains valid to assess due process when gov’t refuses immunity | Quinn: Smith test should remain, with district courts empowered to grant immunity | Gov: Smith’s remedial reach exceeded separation-of-powers; but Smith’s analytical test can inform misconduct review | Court: Retains Smith’s five-part test as a way to evaluate prosecutorial misconduct/due process, but not as authority to grant immunity |
| Whether the Government committed prosecutorial misconduct by delaying Johnson’s sentencing to induce invocation of the Fifth Amendment | Quinn: Delay was tactical to keep Johnson silent and distort factfinding | Gov: The continuance was a legitimate concern about potential perjury at sentencing; no evidence of intent to distort | Court: No clear error or misconduct shown; delay did not demonstrably affect Johnson’s decision or Quinn’s trial outcome; plain-error review fails |
| Whether Johnson’s testimony (if immunized/testified) would have been clearly exculpatory and essential | Quinn: Johnson’s police statement exculpated Quinn and was essential | Gov: Johnson’s statements were inconsistent and credibility weak; other strong evidence against Quinn | Court: Johnson’s testimony was not shown to be clearly exculpatory or sufficiently credible/essential given prosecution’s evidence; Quinn failed Smith test elements |
Key Cases Cited
- Government of the Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980) (created five-part test and recognized judicial use immunity; remedial portion overruled en banc)
- United States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223 (3d Cir. 1976) (prosecutorial interference with defense witnesses can violate due process)
- United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191 (3d Cir. 1978) (discussed prosecutorial misconduct and limits on judicial immunity)
- Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972) (use-and-derivative-use immunity is coextensive with Fifth Amendment privilege and supports compelled testimony when statutorily granted)
- Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968) (limited exclusionary rule protecting defendant’s compelled testimony at suppression hearings; not a general source of judicial power to grant immunity)
- Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248 (1983) (only Attorney General or designated DOJ officers have authority to grant use immunity)
- United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984) (refused to adopt constructive/ judicial grants of use immunity; emphasized Executive’s exclusive role)
- Balsys v. United States, 524 U.S. 666 (1998) (discussed executive immunity option and interjurisdictional considerations)
- Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95 (1972) (judicial/jurist interference warning can drive witnesses off the stand and violate due process)
- Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) (States may have to relax evidentiary rules when they unduly impair the defendant’s right to present a meaningful defense)
