United States v. Keen
676 F.3d 981
| 11th Cir. | 2012Background
- Keen, a Dixie County zoning official, was convicted of fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 666 in case 09-16027 for fraudulently obtaining low-income housing funds.
- Lashley used altered documents to apply for funds in Keen's name; funds were for renovation via county programs.
- In cases 09-16028, 10-10438, 10-10439, Keen and county officials Driggers and Land were convicted of bribery and related charges after an undercover investigation.
- FBI undercover operation involved Agent Quinn paying bribes to two county commissioners in exchange for favorable zoning actions.
- Evidence included Keen’s coordination of payments, his role as intermediary, and recordings; Keen also cooperated with prosecutors.
- All convictions were affirmed, but Keen’s sentence was remanded for re-sentencing after error in grouping offenses under the Sentencing Guidelines.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Keen is an 'agent' of the county under § 666(d)(1). | Keen claims he's not an agent since he lacked funds-specific authorization. | Keen argues § 666 requires agency over funds. | Plain text governs; Keen was an agent. |
| Whether the Statute of Limitations barred Keen’s § 666 conviction. | Limitation began when initial elements were met. | Indicates late indictment should bar prosecution. | Conviction not barred; timely within five-year limit. |
| Sufficiency of evidence on bribery/conspiracy against Keen, Driggers, and Land. | Keen acted as FBI informant; conspiracy not proven. | There was evidence Keen acted as intermediary/co-conspirator. | Sufficient evidence supported convictions. |
| Whether admission of prior-conviction remark tainted the bribery trial; mistrial warranted. | Improper prejudicial evidence required mistrial. | No substantial prejudice; trial not violated. | No reversible error; no due-process violation; potential sanctions noted. |
| Whether grouping 3D1.2 for fraud and bribery was proper; impact on sentence. | Counts involved same plan and harm; should be grouped. | Grouping improper; separate offenses. | Error for grouping; remand for re-sentencing. |
Key Cases Cited
- Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600 (2004) (broad interpretation of § 666 to protect federal funds integrity)
- Fischer v. United States, 529 U.S. 667 (2000) (broad scope to realize Congress' intent in § 666)
- Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52 (1997) (statutory text not to be narrowed by reading for efficiency)
- Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36 (1993) (guideline commentary authoritative unless unconstitutional or inconsistent)
- United States v. Tampas, 493 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2007) (review of sufficiency and trial issues standard)
- United States v. McNair, 605 F.3d 1152 (11th Cir. 2010) (statutory interpretation and sufficiency of evidence under § 666)
- United States v. Lyons, 53 F.3d 1198 (11th Cir. 1995) (conspiracy evidence evaluation standard for jury verdicts)
- United States v. Harper, 972 F.2d 321 (11th Cir. 1992) (grouping of offenses under § 3D1.2(d) framework guidance)
- United States v. Jenkins, 58 F.3d 611 (11th Cir. 1995) (non-grouping of related offenses when not substantially related)