United States v. Kays, 624 F.Supp.3d 1262

Defendant William Shawn Kays indicted on three counts: receipt of a firearm while under indictment (18 U.S.C. § 922(n)) and two counts of possession while subject to a domestic protective order (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)).
Kays moved to declare § 922(g)(8) and § 922(n) facially unconstitutional under the Second Amendment and to dismiss the Superseding Indictment; the government opposed and both parties filed Bruen-focused supplemental briefs.
The controlling framework is Bruen: if the Second Amendment’s plain text covers the conduct, the government must show the regulation is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.
The court held the Second Amendment’s plain text covers Kays’s conduct (rights protected by conduct, not by status such as being indicted or subject to an order).
On the historical-analogue inquiry, the court found the government met its burden: § 922(g)(8) is analogous to longstanding prohibitions on certain classes (e.g., felons/domestic-violence-related restrictions) and § 922(n) is analogous to mid-19th-century surety statutes that conditioned public carry.
Court denied the motion to declare the statutes unconstitutional and preserved the issue for potential appellate review.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the Second Amendment covers the conduct of persons under indictment or subject to a domestic protective order	United States: those who are not "law-abiding" (e.g., indicted persons or persons subject to protective orders) fall outside the scope of protected conduct	Kays: Second Amendment protection turns on conduct, not status; being indicted or subject to an order does not categorically remove coverage	Court: Conduct is covered; rights are not predicated on status
Whether § 922(g)(8) and § 922(n) are consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation (Bruen test)	United States: historical analogues exist—longstanding prohibitions on felons/mentally ill and surety/bonding statutes justify the modern restrictions	Kays: historical support for excluding domestic-order subjects or indicted persons is thin; Bruen forbids means-end balancing	Court: Government met its burden—§ 922(g)(8) analogous to felon/domestic-violence-related exclusions; § 922(n) analogous to surety statutes; both statutes are constitutional

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (recognized individual right to possess commonly used firearms for lawful purposes, notably self-defense in the home)
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (held Second Amendment applies to the States via the Fourteenth Amendment)
New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022) (adopted historical-analogue test: when text covers conduct, government must show consistency with historical tradition)
United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792 (10th Cir. 2010) (upheld § 922(g)(8) pre-Bruen as applied to persons tied to domestic-violence risk)
United States v. Doe, 865 F.3d 1295 (10th Cir. 2017) (circuit precedent not binding when the Supreme Court issues an intervening decision contrary to prior analysis)