United States v. Karmue
841 F.3d 24
| 1st Cir. | 2016Background
- Kormahyah Karmue owned a tenement that was set on fire; he was indicted on multiple federal counts including conspiracy to commit arson (Count I), wire fraud, mail fraud, and theft of government funds. After pleading guilty to theft, he was tried and convicted on conspiracy, wire fraud, and mail fraud (acquitted on substantive arson).
- The government sought at trial to admit arson investigator Sean Reddy both as a fact witness and as an expert; the district court held a two-day Daubert hearing, which Karmue attended on day one but not on day two. Counsel objected to proceeding in Karmue’s absence.
- Post-trial, the government moved under Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c)(2) to correct a statutory citation in the caption of Count I (from § 844(m) to § 844(n)); the magistrate granted the motion but the correction appeared only on co-defendant’s docket; the district court later formally corrected Karmue’s indictment prior to sentencing.
- Two days before sentencing Karmue filed a pro se letter alleging serious conflict with appointed counsel (West) and requested substitute counsel; West moved to withdraw. At sentencing the court conducted a colloquy with counsel and denied substitution, offering Karmue the choice of proceeding pro se or keeping West.
- Karmue appealed, raising three principal claims: (1) district court erred by conducting the Daubert hearing in his absence (Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause, Due Process, Rule 43), (2) post-trial correction of the indictment citation prejudiced him, and (3) district court erred by refusing to appoint new counsel at sentencing.
Issues
| Issue | Karmue's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1) Conducting portion of Daubert hearing in defendant's absence (Confrontation / Due Process / Rule 43) | Absence violated Sixth Amendment confrontation, Due Process right to be present, and Rule 43 | Any error was harmless; Daubert ruling supported by record; Rule 43 and Stincer do not mandate presence for such pretrial hearings | Affirmed — even if Confrontation or Due Process applied, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; plain-error review on other claims failed (no clear error or prejudice) |
| 2) Post-trial correction of statutory citation in Count I under Rule 7(c)(2) | Correction after trial was improper and prejudiced his decision to go to trial (changed exposure via mandatory minimum) | Caption mistake was patent; indictment text and other filings put defense on notice of correct statute; no prejudice | Affirmed — no reversible error because defendant was not misled and suffered no prejudice |
| 3) Denial of substitution of counsel at sentencing | Court should have appointed new counsel given alleged breakdown and motion to withdraw by counsel | District court adequately inquired, counsel stated ability to proceed, motion untimely and rooted in trial-strategy disputes; no abuse of discretion | Affirmed — district court did not abuse discretion in denying substitution |
Key Cases Cited
- Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (standard for admissibility of expert testimony)
- United States v. Liriano, 761 F.3d 131 (1st Cir. 2014) (standard of review for confrontation clause issues preserved below)
- Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730 (1987) (due process right to be present requires defendant's presence to contribute to fairness)
- United States v. Isabel, 945 F.2d 1193 (1st Cir. 1991) (patent statutory citation errors in indictments do not require reversal absent prejudice)
- United States v. Godfrey, 787 F.3d 72 (1st Cir. 2015) (overwhelming independent evidence can render evidentiary error harmless)
- United States v. Sepúlveda-Contreras, 466 F.3d 166 (1st Cir. 2006) (harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard for constitutional error)
- United States v. Myers, 294 F.3d 203 (1st Cir. 2002) (abuse-of-discretion framework for substitution-of-counsel requests)