United States v. Karla Myles, 962 F.3d 384

Karla Myles initially told police that Eric Sallis shot a man (T.C.) inside her daughter's house, but before a federal grand jury she testified falsely that she had not entered the house, had no knowledge of the shooting, and was not threatened.
A grand jury charged Myles under 18 U.S.C. § 1623 for making a false material declaration; she asserted a duress defense and the government moved to exclude duress evidence.
At an evidentiary hearing Myles admitted lying and testified she feared retaliation based on rumors she heard through her sister and niece but received no direct threats and did not report the rumors to police.
The district court excluded the duress evidence as insufficient to meet the elements (no specific imminent threat; reasonable alternatives existed) and Myles entered a conditional guilty plea reserving appeal.
At sentencing the court applied a cross-reference (USSG § 2X3.1) to Sallis’s felon-in-possession offense, treating his base offense level as 20 (including a 4-level increase for connection to another felony) and subtracting six levels to arrive at a base offense level of 18 for Myles; the court varied downward and sentenced her to 24 months.

Issue	Myles' Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Whether the district court erred by excluding duress evidence	Myles: rumors and fear of reprisal established duress warranting admission	Govt: evidence was only generalized/rumors and insufficient as a matter of law	Affirmed—duress requires a specific, imminent threat and no reasonable legal alternative; Myles failed to prove duress by a preponderance
Who bears the burden to prove duress	Myles: under Harper a defendant need only make a prima facie showing and gov't must disprove beyond a reasonable doubt	Govt: after Dixon the defendant bears the burden to prove duress by a preponderance	Court followed Dixon—defendant must prove duress by a preponderance; prima facie standard insufficient
Whether sentencing cross-reference improperly attributed Sallis’s criminal-history enhancements to Myles	Myles: she lacked knowledge of Sallis’s prior violent felony and of an unlawful additional felony (the shooting), so enhancements shouldn’t apply	Govt: §2X3.1 assigns base level from the underlying offense regardless of defendant’s knowledge of the facts establishing that base level; defendant accountable for specific offense characteristics she knew or should have known	Affirmed—court correctly applied base offense level 20 and the 4-level increase because Myles knew or should have known Sallis committed another offense

Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1 (2006) (reaffirmed that defendant bears burden to prove duress by a preponderance under common law)
United States v. Jankowski, 194 F.3d 878 (8th Cir. 1999) (sets elements of duress/coercion defense)
United States v. Harper, 466 F.3d 634 (8th Cir. 2006) (discussed prima facie framework for coercion defenses but reconsidered in light of Dixon)
United States v. Davis, 825 F.3d 359 (8th Cir. 2016) (interpreting USSG § 2X3.1 to allow attribution of underlying offense base level without defendant’s knowledge of underlying facts)
United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 (1980) (evidence must support defense by preponderance to be admitted)
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (grand jury’s need for truthful testimony)
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (grand jury subpoena power essential to function)

Judgment affirmed.