United States v. Kar, 851 F.3d 59

Ernest Kar was charged with bank fraud and conspiracy related to a counterfeit check-cashing scheme; appointed counsel Melissa Larsen represented him throughout pretrial and trial stages.
Kar repeatedly sought substitute counsel (September, October, November 2014 and January 2015), alleging poor communication and dissatisfaction with Larsen’s strategy; the district court denied substitution after multiple hearings.
Kar then moved to proceed pro se; after a thorough Faretta colloquy the district court granted self-representation and appointed Larsen as standby counsel; Kar continued to consult Larsen during trial.
During trial the government disclosed that a U.S. Attorney’s Office paralegal personally knew one juror (Juror Number One); the juror said the relationship was a family friend/babysitting connection, denied discussing the case, and affirmed impartiality; the court refused Kar’s request to strike her.
The jury convicted Kar on three bank-fraud counts and one conspiracy count; Kar was sentenced to 93 months’ imprisonment (84 plus 9 months consecutive) and ordered to pay $532,152 restitution.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Denial of substituted appointed counsel	Kar: court repeatedly refused to appoint new counsel, depriving him of effective assistance	Government/Ct: court adequately inquired; communications existed and conflicts were dissatisfaction, not breakdown	Denial was not an abuse of discretion under Allen factors; no total communication breakdown
Validity of waiver of counsel / Faretta waiver	Kar: waiver was not unequivocal; he vacillated and was forced into pro se by denial of new counsel	Government/Ct: court conducted thorough Faretta colloquy; Kar unequivocally stated he wished to proceed pro se	Waiver was knowing, intelligent, voluntary, and unequivocal; court did not abuse discretion
Standby counsel rights / impact on fairness	Kar: presence of unwanted standby counsel and consultations showed coercion or ineffective assistance	Government/Ct: standby appointment was proper; Kar understood role and continued to confer with Larsen voluntarily	Standby counsel appointment appropriate; no Sixth Amendment violation
Juror impartiality (Juror Number One)	Kar: juror’s personal relationship with government's paralegal created implied bias; juror should be struck or made an alternate	Government/Ct: juror denied bias; relationship was casual (family friend/babysitting) and did not fit extreme circumstances requiring removal	No manifest error or clear abuse of discretion; juror not biased in fact or as a matter of law

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (defendant has right to self-representation if waiver of counsel is knowing and intelligent)
Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153 (1988) (Sixth Amendment guarantees effective advocate, not counsel of choice)
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (right to counsel and standards for waiver)
Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415 (1991) (trial-court findings on juror impartiality reviewed for manifest error)
Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (1982) (concurrence describing circumstances giving rise to implied juror bias)
Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010) (deference to district court on juror-bias assessments)
United States v. Allen, 789 F.2d 90 (1st Cir. 1986) (three-factor test for substitute-counsel motions)
United States v. Proctor, 166 F.3d 396 (1st Cir. 1999) (courts may require choice between unwanted counsel and self-representation)
United States v. Francois, 715 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2013) (application of Allen factors and Faretta waiver principles)
United States v. Godfrey, 787 F.3d 72 (1st Cir. 2015) (standard for juror impartiality review)