United States v. Kamper
2012 WL 1618296
E.D. Tenn.2012Background
- Kamper pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute MDMA; conduct occurred Oct 2009–Jan 2011; amount involved per PSR was 1,218.75 g of MDMA, for which Kamper accepted responsibility.
- Kamper moved for determination of an MDMA-to-marijuana ratio pursuant to Kimbrough and for a §3553(a) variance; government filed response to Kamper’s Kimbrough motion and did not respond to the variance.
- Historical MDMA-to-marijuana ratios: prior to 2001, 1 g MDMA : 35 g marijuana; 2001 amendment shifted to a current 1:500 ratio after Congressional directive.
- MDMA-related legislative history: Ecstasy Anti-Proliferation Act directed the Sentencing Commission to study penalties; the MDMA Report guided the Commission’s ratio decision after extensive input.
- The Commission concluded MDMA offenses should be more severe than powder cocaine but less severe than heroin, establishing the 1:500 MDMA-to-marijuana equivalency.
- Kamper urged a reject-and-replace approach to adopt a lower ratio; the Court rejected this approach, favoring an adjudicative three-step process with potential variance rather than legislative amendment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| May court reject 1:500 ratio and replace it? | Kamper argues for categorical rejection and replacement ratio per Kimbrough/Spears. | Kamper contends the MDMA ratio lacks empirical support and differs from crack-to-powder context. | Denied; court declined to legislate a new ratio. |
| Can court apply 1:500 in calculating range and variate if needed? | Kamper seeks non-Guideline sentence based on policy disagreement. | Kamper argues for lower ratio; government favors current ratio. | Held: court used 1:500 for range but could vary under §3553(a). |
| Does separation-of-powers limit the court's role here? | Kamper asserts courts may revise policy; Congress/Commission should set ratio. | Government argues Commission better suited; avoid legislative role for courts. | Held: court remains adjudicative; defers to Commission for policy changes. |
Key Cases Cited
- Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (U.S. Supreme Court 1989) (Congress vested sentencing guidelines in an independent agency; separation of powers central to framework)
- Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (U.S. Supreme Court 2007) (upheld district-court policy disagreement with guideline margins; empirical data importance)
- Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261 (U.S. Supreme Court 2009) (reaffirmed replacement ratio when rejecting guideline; cautioned against subterfuge)
- Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (U.S. Supreme Court 2007) (guidelines start as the initial benchmark; consider §3553(a) factors in final step)
- Phelps v. United States, 366 F. Supp. 2d 580 (E.D. Tenn. 2005) (three-step sentencing methodology framework used by court)
- Rothwell v. United States, 847 F. Supp. 2d 1048 (E.D. Tenn. 2012) (discussed three-step approach and §3553 in drug-trafficking context)
- Vandewege v. United States, 561 F.3d 608 (6th Cir. 2009) (limits to broad reject-and-replace power outside crack-to-powder context)
- Ferguson v. United States, 447 Fed. Appx. 898 (10th Cir. 2012) (affirmed district court's discretion not to vary from 1:500 ratio)