United States v. Jurek, 1:11-cr-00433

AT&T technician Anthony Finlaw viewed images of child pornography on Jason Jurek’s computer during a service call and reported it to law enforcement; police obtained a search warrant and seized Jurek’s computer.
A federal grand jury indicted Jurek on two counts: receipt of child pornography (18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2)) and possession of child pornography (18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B)).
Jurek moved to suppress evidence, arguing government involvement in the technician’s search; the district court held an evidentiary hearing and denied the motion; the denial was affirmed by the Sixth Circuit.
Jurek entered a conditional guilty plea to Count 1 (receipt) reserving his right to appeal suppression rulings; he was sentenced to 61 months’ imprisonment and appealed; the Sixth Circuit affirmed.
Jurek filed a § 2255 petition claiming ineffective assistance of counsel in (1) preparation for/during the suppression hearing, (2) advising him to plead guilty (regarding mandatory minimums and equivalence of offenses), and (3) that counsel’s failures rendered his plea unknowing.
The district court denied the § 2255 motion without an evidentiary hearing, finding the record conclusively refuted Jurek’s claims and that counsel’s actions were reasonable trial strategy; the court also declined a certificate of appealability.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
1. Was counsel ineffective at the suppression hearing?	Jurek says counsel failed to prepare: did not call his son, obtain technician’s records, AT&T protocols, or AT&T witness to show government involvement.	Government points to record: counsel did cross-examine Finlaw about prior contacts; court excluded some lines; AT&T policy was submitted; witnesses testified no preexisting relationship with law enforcement.	Denied — counsel’s choices were reasonable strategy; record refutes ineffective assistance.
2. Was counsel ineffective in advising plea (mandatory minimums/statutory sameness)?	Jurek contends counsel failed to advise that the possession count lacked a mandatory minimum and was statutorily same as receipt.	Government: receipt and possession are distinct; possession is a lesser‑included offense of receipt; counsel’s advice reasonable; defendant had no entitlement to a particular plea offer.	Denied — premise incorrect; receipt and possession are not the same; no prejudice shown.
3. Was the plea unknowing due to counsel’s failures?	Jurek claims suppression-phase failures led to an unknowing/ involuntary plea.	Government: plea colloquy and plea agreement show plea was voluntary, knowing, and defendant satisfied with counsel.	Denied — record shows plea was knowing, voluntary, and counseled.

Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63 (1977) (judge may dismiss § 2255 motion summarily when record conclusively refutes claims)
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985) (standard for ineffective assistance in guilty‑plea context requires prejudice showing that but for errors defendant would not have pleaded)
Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012) (no constitutional right to be offered a plea bargain)
Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012) (counsel’s duties regarding plea offers and communication)
Campbell v. Coyle, 260 F.3d 531 (6th Cir. 2001) (deference to reasonable counsel strategy even if mistaken)
Warner v. United States, 975 F.2d 1207 (6th Cir. 1992) (applying Hill standard)
United States v. Marshall, 736 F.3d 492 (6th Cir. 2013) (possession is a lesser included offense of receipt)