United States v. Junaidu Savage
885 F.3d 212
| 4th Cir. | 2018Background
- Between Jan–Apr 2012, Junaidu Savage, Jayad Conteh (a Capital One teller), Mumtaz Sadique, and others conspired to access and take funds from customer accounts by using Conteh’s insider access to obtain confidential account information and then changing account contact info and ordering checks. Conteh provided account data (often via a phone number tied to Savage) and testified that Savage’s voice appears on recorded calls to Capital One.
- Conteh was arrested and convicted; she later entered a proffer then a cooperation agreement with the government and testified for the prosecution at Savage’s trial. The government disclosed summaries of Conteh’s inconsistent statements to Savage prior to trial.
- Savage was indicted for bank fraud conspiracy (18 U.S.C. § 1349) and two counts of aggravated identity theft (18 U.S.C. § 1028A). He was convicted on all counts and sentenced to a total of 87 months’ imprisonment (51 months on the conspiracy, plus mandatory consecutive terms for the identity‑theft counts), restitution, and forfeiture.
- At trial Savage moved for judgment of acquittal (denied), moved to compel the prosecutor’s personal notes under Jencks/Brady (court declined in‑camera review), requested a specific accomplice‑testimony instruction (denied), and objected to the court giving the jury a written aiding‑and‑abetting instruction (which the court provided at the jury’s request).
- At sentencing the court imposed guideline enhancements for obstruction of justice, a 10‑level loss calculation based on intended loss (~$186,000), a 2‑level sophisticated‑means enhancement, and a 3‑level role enhancement for manager/supervisor; part of the identity‑theft sentences were ordered consecutive. Savage appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Savage’s Argument | Government’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence for bank‑fraud conspiracy | Evidence insufficient to show Savage was a knowing, willing participant | Conteh’s accomplice testimony, voice ID on recorded calls, and Savage’s videotaped admissions support conviction | Affirmed: uncorroborated accomplice testimony can suffice; circumstantial evidence and videotape supported jury verdict |
| Jencks Act / Brady in‑camera review of prosecutor’s personal notes | District court should have reviewed prosecutor’s notes in camera because they likely contained additional inconsistent/impeaching statements from Conteh | Savage failed to make the required foundation or plausible showing of material, favorable evidence in the notes | Affirmed: no in‑camera review required—Savage did not identify statements with particularity or plausibly show material Brady evidence |
| Jury instructions (accomplice caution and written aiding‑and‑abetting instruction) | Court erred by refusing requested cautionary accomplice instruction and by giving the jury only a written aiding‑and‑abetting instruction (prejudicial/selective) | The court’s charge already cautioned about biased/accomplice witnesses and prior inconsistent statements; providing the single written instruction was within discretion and the jury was told to view instructions as a whole | Affirmed: requested instruction was substantially covered; providing the requested written aiding‑and‑abetting instruction was not prejudicial abuse of discretion |
| Sentencing guideline applications and consecutive identity‑theft sentences | Several guideline enhancements and partial consecutive terms were improper (obstruction, loss amount, sophisticated means, role) | District court’s factual findings supported each enhancement by required standards; consecutive partial sentence appropriate under §1028A and §3553(a) factors | Affirmed: court properly applied obstruction enhancement, reasonably estimated intended loss, permissibly found sophisticated means and managerial role, and reasonably imposed partial consecutive identity‑theft sentences |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Gillion, 704 F.3d 284 (4th Cir. 2013) (standard for reviewing denial of judgment of acquittal and substantial evidence review)
- United States v. Manbeck, 744 F.2d 360 (4th Cir. 1984) (uncorroborated accomplice testimony can support conviction)
- Dunnigan v. United States, 507 U.S. 87 (1993) (standards for finding perjury and applying obstruction enhancement)
- United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) (Brady materiality standard: reasonable probability of different result)
- United States v. Miller, 316 F.3d 495 (4th Cir. 2003) (loss amount as factual determination; reasonable estimate of loss)
- Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (1985) (clear‑error standard for factual findings)