United States v. Julius Jones, 919 F.3d 1064

On July 1, 2015, two masked, armed men entered Curt’s Grocery, shot manager Lee Sawyer multiple times, seized his pistol and a shotgun, and took cash and two bank-branded moneybags (~$5,000 total).
Sawyer and cashier Tracey Hon later identified Julius Lamon Jones (and his brother Dontario) by voice/facial recognition; Jones’s DNA was later found on a ski mask recovered from the crashed getaway car.
Police pursuit after the robbery led to a crash of the first getaway car; Antonio Brown (co-defendant) was arrested; a second vehicle (a Cadillac Escalade driven by Reshawn Jones) was stopped within an hour and contained two Curt’s Grocery moneybags.
At trial Jones was charged with Hobbs Act robbery (18 U.S.C. § 1951) and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)). The jury convicted on both counts; the district court sentenced Jones to 188 months (Count I) plus 120 months consecutive (Count II).
During cross-examination defense counsel asked Sawyer about whether he told initial officers he recognized voices; Sawyer replied that he told officers it was “the same two guys that robbed me the first time,” eliciting a reference to an uncharged prior robbery.
The district court denied Jones’s motion for a mistrial and refused to grant judgment of acquittal; on appeal the Eighth Circuit affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Motion for mistrial based on witness’s reference to prior robbery	Jones: Sawyer’s answer was non-responsive and injected unfairly prejudicial prior-bad-act evidence; defense never opened the door	Government: Defense’s cross led to the answer; no government solicitation or bad faith; evidence against Jones was overwhelming	Affirmed: No abuse of discretion; answer was responsive to defense questioning, defense opened the door, no plain error for not giving sua sponte curative instruction
Whether Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a "crime of violence" under § 924(c)(3)(A)	Jones: Hobbs Act can encompass non-forceful forms (conspiracy, fear) so it may not categorically have force as an element; § 924(c)(3)(B) (residual clause) is vague per Dimaya	Government: Binding circuit precedent holds Hobbs Act robbery has as an element the use/threat of physical force and thus qualifies under the elements clause § 924(c)(3)(A)	Affirmed: Hobbs Act robbery is a predicate crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A); Dimaya’s invalidation of the residual clause does not affect this conclusion

United States v. Daniel, 887 F.3d 350 (8th Cir. 2018) (standard for viewing facts in light most favorable to the jury)
United States v. Sanchez-Garcia, 685 F.3d 745 (8th Cir. 2012) (factors for mistrial based on improper witness remark)
United States v. LeGrand, 468 F.3d 1077 (8th Cir. 2006) (plain-error review when no curative instruction requested)
United States v. Diaz, 863 F.3d 781 (8th Cir. 2017) (Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A))
Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018) (invalidated language like § 924(c)(3)(B) as unconstitutionally vague)
United States v. Bowens, 907 F.3d 347 (5th Cir. 2018) (circuit precedent treating Hobbs Act robbery as a categorical crime of violence under the elements clause)
United States v. Rounsavall, 115 F.3d 561 (8th Cir. 1997) (discussing when witness references to prior bad acts do not justify mistrial)