United States v. Juan Reyes
16-50286
| 9th Cir. | Nov 24, 2017Background
- Defendant Juan Reyes was arrested in November 2013, released, and later indicted and arrested pursuant to that indictment in March 2015. He entered a conditional guilty plea reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss.
- Reyes argued four bases for dismissal related to delays between his initial encounter/arrest and subsequent presentation/trial: violations of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 5 and 9, Rule 48(b), the Speedy Trial Act, and the Sixth Amendment speedy-trial guarantee.
- The government did not present Reyes to a magistrate at the November 2013 encounter; Reyes was not in custody then and was not arrested on a warrant at that time.
- Reyes’s formal appearance before a judicial officer occurred in March 2015, which the court treated as the triggering event for Speedy Trial Act deadlines.
- The district court found delay attributable to government negligence but not bad faith; Reyes had requested multiple continuances before asserting his speedy-trial right.
- The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding none of Reyes’s four claimed grounds required dismissal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Fed. R. Crim. P. 5 and 9 were violated by not presenting Reyes to a magistrate after Nov. 2013 encounter | Reyes: officers waited ~2 years to present him, violating Rules 5 and 9 | Government: Rule 5 applies only to persons in custody; Rule 9 applies to officers executing a warrant; neither applied to the Nov. 2013 release encounter | Court: No violation — Reyes was not in custody and not arrested on a warrant, so Rules 5 and 9 did not apply |
| Whether Fed. R. Crim. P. 48(b) (dismissal for unnecessary delay) was violated | Reyes: undue delay in bringing him to trial merits Rule 48(b) relief | Government: Rule 48(b) applies only after arrest; arrests pursuant to the indictment occurred in March 2015 | Court: No violation — Rule 48(b) does not apply to pre-indictment delay |
| Whether the Speedy Trial Act was violated | Reyes: trial was delayed unreasonably from initial encounter | Government: Act’s clock begins at defendant’s appearance before a judicial officer or filing of indictment; Reyes first appeared in March 2015 | Court: No violation — clock began at March 2015 appearance, so Act was satisfied |
| Whether the Sixth Amendment speedy-trial right was violated under Barker balancing | Reyes: 16-month delay between indictment and arrest prejudiced him (anxiety, lost defenses, sentencing exposure) | Government: delay was negligent but not in bad faith; Reyes waited and sought continuances before asserting right; prejudice insufficient | Court: No constitutional violation — Barker factors weighed: length and negligence favored Reyes slightly, assertion was neutral, prejudice not shown; overall no Sixth Amendment breach |
Key Cases Cited
- Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (establishing four-factor speedy-trial balancing test)
- Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992) (length of delay is threshold inquiry)
- United States v. Barken, 412 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 2005) (Rule 48(b) applies only after arrest)
- United States v. Kidd, 734 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1984) (pre-indictment delay not governed by Rule 48(b))
- United States v. Gregory, 322 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2003) (delay durations and weight in Barker analysis)
- United States v. Tanh Huu Lam, 251 F.3d 852 (9th Cir. 2001) (delay length weighed slightly for defendant)
- United States v. Beamon, 992 F.2d 1009 (9th Cir. 1993) (delays near one-year benchmark not necessarily "great")
- United States v. Mendoza, 530 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008) (timing of defendant's assertion of speedy-trial right affects Barker analysis)