United States v. Juan Ramos
892 F.3d 599
| 3rd Cir. | 2018Background
- Juan Ramos had prior state convictions: 1998 aggravated assault (pled guilty), 1999 drug conviction, and 2001 burglary; federal case arose from 2008 drug/weapon arrest.
- At initial sentencing Ramos was treated as a career offender (including ACCA exposure) and received a 180-month sentence; that sentence was vacated after Johnson II.
- At resentencing the government argued Ramos remained a Guidelines career offender (needs two predicates); Ramos argued his 1998 aggravated assault was not a "crime of violence."
- District Court found Ramos was not a career offender and sentenced him to 105 months; the government appealed that ruling.
- The record (bill of information and plea document) showed Ramos was charged with § 2702(a)(1) and § 2702(a)(4) and that he pled guilty to the F2 count—§ 2702(a)(4) (second-degree aggravated assault with a deadly weapon; the weapon was a brick).
- The Third Circuit applied the modified categorical approach, held § 2702(a) divisible, concluded Ramos’s conviction was § 2702(a)(4), and ruled that § 2702(a)(4) is categorically a "crime of violence," making Ramos a Guidelines career offender.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Ramos’s § 2702(a) aggravated assault conviction qualifies as a "crime of violence" under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1) | Ramos: § 2702 can cover non‑forceful conduct (e.g., omissions) so (a)(4) is not categorically a crime of violence | Government: § 2702(a)(4) requires attempt/intentional or knowing causation of bodily injury with a deadly weapon—necessarily involves physical force | Held: § 2702(a)(4) necessarily involves use/attempted use of physical force and is a crime of violence under the elements clause |
| Whether Pennsylvania’s § 2702 is divisible (permitting modified categorical approach) | Ramos: Pennsylvania practice (jury unanimity on subsection) indicates subsections are means, not elements, so statute indivisible | Government: Subsections carry different degrees/punishments and set alternative elements, making the statute divisible | Held: § 2702 is divisible into first- and second-degree offenses and into alternative second-degree subsections; modified categorical approach applies |
| Whether the charging and plea documents identify the specific subsection of conviction with certainty | Ramos: PSR ambiguity leaves doubt about which subsection was the basis for conviction | Government: Bill of information and plea ("Guilty as F2") plainly show Ramos pled to the § 2702(a)(4) F2 count (deadly weapon) | Held: Extra‑statutory materials establish with certainty the conviction was for § 2702(a)(4) (second-degree with a deadly weapon) |
Key Cases Cited
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (distinguishing elements from means; divisibility analysis)
- Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013) (limiting inquiry to categorical/modified categorical approaches)
- Castleman v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1405 (2014) (statute criminalizing intentional or knowing causation of bodily injury necessarily involves physical force)
- Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (facts increasing punishment must be elements submitted to a jury)
- Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (2013) (categorical approach requires assuming minimum conduct criminalized)
- United States v. Chapman, 866 F.3d 129 (3d Cir. 2017) (applying Castleman standard in career-offender context)
- United States v. Brown, 765 F.3d 185 (3d Cir. 2014) (use of Shepard documents under modified categorical approach)