United States v. Juan Price, 980 F.3d 1211

Background

On an international overnight flight from Tokyo to Los Angeles, Juan Pablo Price moved to the seat next to A.M., a sleeping 21‑year‑old passenger, and touched her breast and vagina without verbal consent; A.M. and a friend reported the incident to flight crew.
Flight crew alerted law enforcement; Price was interviewed by FBI agents at LAX and later indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (abusive sexual contact in special maritime/territorial jurisdiction).
At trial the district court instructed the jury using the Ninth Circuit model: the government must prove (1) the defendant knowingly had sexual contact, and (2) the contact was without the victim’s permission; the court rejected Price’s requested instruction that the government must also prove the defendant knew the contact was without permission.
Price moved to suppress physical evidence and statements, arguing he was arrested without probable cause and that his Miranda waiver was not knowing/voluntary; the district court denied suppression and admitted statements after finding probable cause and a valid waiver.
The jury convicted Price; on appeal the Ninth Circuit affirmed: (1) "knowingly" in § 2244(b) modifies only that the defendant knowingly engaged in sexual contact (not that he knew lack of consent), (2) officers had probable cause to arrest, (3) Miranda waiver and statements were valid, and (4) the district court did not abuse discretion by refusing a readback of the victim’s testimony.

Issues

Issue	Price's Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Mens rea scope under 18 U.S.C. § 2244(b) — does "knowingly" apply to lack of permission?	The government must prove the defendant subjectively knew the sexual contact was without the victim’s permission.	"Knowingly" grammatically modifies only the act of engaging in sexual contact; lack of permission is an objective element the government must prove (no subjective knowledge required).	Affirmed: "knowingly" applies to engaging in sexual contact, not to knowing lack of permission; permission (or lack thereof) is an objective element.
Probable cause for arrest at deplaning	Arrest lacked probable cause; actions were routine border procedures.	Flight crew report, purser’s statements, and pilot message provided reasonably trustworthy information to establish probable cause.	Affirmed: officers had probable cause to arrest Price when he deplaned.
Validity of Miranda waiver and admissibility of statements	Price did not adequately understand his rights; waiver not knowing/voluntary.	Price read and signed advice form, engaged during explanation, was not coerced; waiver and statements were voluntary.	Affirmed: waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary; statements admissible.
Jury readback request for victim testimony	Jury requested readback; district court erred by denying it while replaying the FBI interview.	Readbacks can unduly emphasize a portion of testimony; logistical concerns and unfair focus justified denial.	Affirmed: district court did not abuse discretion in denying the readback.

Key Cases Cited

United States v. X‑Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994) (grammatical scope of "knowingly" may require broader reading where literal reading would be absurd)
Flores‑Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646 (2009) (presumption that mens rea term applies to all elements in certain grammatical contexts)
United States v. Backman, 817 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2016) ("knowingly" construed to modify only specified verbs; jurisdictional phrase treated separately)
United States v. Bruguier, 735 F.3d 754 (8th Cir. 2013) (applying Flores‑Figueroa to require knowledge of victim’s incapacity under related statute)
Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994) (presumption of mens rea where strict liability would criminalize otherwise innocent conduct)
Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015) (read mens rea into statutes only as necessary to distinguish wrongful from innocent conduct)
United States v. Pierre, 254 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2001) (harmless‑error standard for erroneous jury instructions)
United States v. Bravo, 295 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 2002) (border context: when detention becomes an arrest)
Beier v. City of Lewiston, 354 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2004) (probable cause standard: fair probability under totality of circumstances)