United States v. Juan Gordon, 664 F. App'x 242

Detective Christopher Minton swore an affidavit seeking a warrant to search Juan Gordon’s person and car in a heroin-distribution investigation. The affidavit referenced a “confidential source,” observed surveillance, and recounted that Gordon drove Damon Agurs briefly, after which Agurs was stopped and 500 stamp bags of heroin were recovered. A drug dog alerted at Gordon’s driver-side door; Gordon and his car were secured for a warrant.
The magistrate issued the warrant; the search produced cash and Gordon’s phone. Gordon was indicted on heroin distribution and possession-with-intent charges under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 846.
During discovery the Government disclosed that the cited “confidential source” was another law‑enforcement officer relying on Title III wiretap information, not a civilian informant.
Gordon moved for a Franks hearing, alleging Detective Minton’s affidavit was deliberately or recklessly misleading by mischaracterizing the source, and that the misstatements were material to probable cause.
The District Court denied a Franks hearing, concluding that even assuming deliberate falsity, the alleged misstatements were not material to probable cause. The Third Circuit affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the district court erred by denying a Franks hearing without resolving deliberate falsity	Gordon: court must address both Franks prongs; it erred by assuming falsity and deciding only materiality	Government: defendant must make a preliminary showing as to both prongs; if materiality fails, no need to reach falsity	Court: No error—Franks requires a substantial preliminary showing of both prongs but district court may deny if defendant fails on either; it properly denied on materiality alone
Whether mischaracterizing the source as a "confidential source" was material to probable cause	Gordon: the misstatement/omission was material and, if removed, probable cause would fail	Government: even excluding the informant allegations, remaining facts (prior conviction, Agurs’ dealer status, heroin found on Agurs, dog alert, surveillance) suffice for probable cause	Court: Held statements were not material; the remaining affidavit established a fair probability of finding evidence of heroin
Whether the district court relied on extraneous Title III evidence beyond the four corners of the affidavit	Gordon: court relied on broader Title III facts, so affidavit alone was insufficient	Government: district court evaluated the affidavit on its face; record contradicts Gordon’s claim	Court: No support that the District Court relied on outside Title III materials; plenary review shows affidavit (excluding CI reference) sufficed

Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) (establishes two‑prong test and preliminary showing requirement for hearing on false statements in warrant affidavits)
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (totality‑of‑the‑circumstances test for probable cause)
United States v. Yusuf, 461 F.3d 374 (3d Cir. 2006) (Franks materiality standard; informant reliability principles)
United States v. Shields, 458 F.3d 269 (3d Cir. 2006) (standards for appellate review of warrant affidavit probable cause rulings)
United States v. Stearn, 597 F.3d 540 (3d Cir. 2010) (prior drug convictions and drug‑related activity can support probable cause to search)
Sherwood v. Mulvihill, 113 F.3d 396 (3d Cir. 1997) (explains materiality inquiry where falsity is conceded)