United States v. Joshua Hayworth
682 F. App'x 369
| 6th Cir. | 2017Background
- On Jan. 30, 2014, Hayworth, wearing a face covering and carrying an airsoft pistol, robbed a Burger King, fled in a car, wrecked it, and initially escaped; officers recovered cash, the pistol, his phone, and parole ID from the wreck.
- Hayworth obtained a Jeep days later; an FBI agent recognized him on Feb. 3, he led agents on a high-speed flight, then abandoned the Jeep and a manhunt ensued.
- While police were searching, Hayworth burst into a residential driveway, demanded keys from two women, and wrestled with Sarah Gulley (nine months pregnant) who had fallen; he jabbed her and seized her keys, took her car, released her dog, and then wrecked that vehicle as well.
- Hayworth was later found hiding and arrested; he was tried, convicted by a jury of Hobbs Act robbery (18 U.S.C. § 1951), aiding and abetting, and carjacking (18 U.S.C. § 2119), and sentenced to 200 months’ imprisonment.
- On appeal he challenged (1) sufficiency of the evidence for carjacking (specifically the intent-to-cause-death-or-serious-bodily-harm element), (2) claimed jury bias from emotional testimony, and (3) substantive reasonableness of his upward-variance sentence.
Issues
| Issue | Hayworth's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence as to carjacking intent (intent to cause death or serious bodily harm) | No specific intent — he lacked a weapon and even released the dog, showing no intent to harm | Totality of conduct (striking/struggling with a pregnant, fallen victim) shows conditional intent to cause serious harm if resisted | Affirmed: evidence sufficient to prove conditional intent under § 2119 |
| Jury impartiality due to emotional impact of victim testimony | Prosecutor elicited last, emotional testimony to inflame jurors; verdict was driven by passion, prejudice, sympathy | Court instructions and no prosecutorial misconduct; jurors presumed capable of setting aside emotion and deciding on evidence | Affirmed: no showing of trial fundamentally unfair or juror partiality |
| Substantive reasonableness of 200-month upward variance sentence | Sentence excessive compared to Guidelines (110–137 months); variance disproportionate | District court permissibly weighed violent offense conduct, extensive violent criminal history, parole status, and need to protect public/deter | Affirmed: district court did not abuse discretion; substantial justification for upward variance |
Key Cases Cited
- Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1 (1999) (§ 2119 intent may be conditional — intent to harm if victim resists)
- United States v. Adams, 265 F.3d 420 (6th Cir. 2001) (specific-intent crimes require proof of defendant’s mental state)
- United States v. Fekete, 535 F.3d 471 (6th Cir. 2008) (evaluate conditional intent under the totality of circumstances)
- United States v. Edmond, 815 F.3d 1032 (6th Cir. 2016) (physical struggle over keys can demonstrate intent for § 2119)
- Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010) (presumption that jurors set aside preconceptions and decide based on evidence)
- Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) (appellate review of sentencing reasonableness is abuse-of-discretion)
- United States v. Lanning, 633 F.3d 469 (6th Cir. 2011) (give deference to district court’s assessment of § 3553(a) factors when reviewing extent of variance)
- United States v. Webb, 403 F.3d 373 (6th Cir. 2005) (district court may weigh criminal history heavily when justified)
- United States v. Vowell, 516 F.3d 503 (6th Cir. 2008) (district court must provide adequate reasons for an upward variance)