United States v. Josh Small, 988 F.3d 241

Background

In June 2018 two defendants, Josh Small and Joni Johnson, drove from West Virginia to Rocky Top, Tennessee, entered Linda Spoon’s home, held her at gunpoint, bound her wrists/ankles for ~20–25 minutes, ransacked the house, stole valuables, then fled in the same vehicle across state lines.
Police tied the defendants to the crime via vehicle surveillance, pawnshop receipts (including a Knoxville address), and an active warrant; Small was arrested in West Virginia and Johnson was arrested two days later.
Defendants were indicted under the Federal Kidnapping Statute (18 U.S.C. § 1201) for kidnapping and conspiracy to kidnap; the jury convicted both on both counts.
During deliberations the jury asked for definitions of “confined,” “seized,” and “abducted”; the district court (with parties’ input) read Merriam‑Webster definitions to the jury.
At sentencing the PSRs listed six similar uncharged home‑invasion/kidnapping incidents; the government presented testimony about four of them, the court found the PSR facts reliable by a preponderance, sustained an upward variance, and sentenced Small to 360 months and Johnson to 300 months.
On appeal defendants challenged (1) sufficiency of the evidence under §1201 (ransom/reward and interstate commerce nexus), (2) the district court’s dictionary definitions to the jury, (3) the court’s refusal to hold an evidentiary hearing on Small’s pro se suppression/Brady claims, and (4) procedural and substantive reasonableness of the sentences.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Sufficiency — "ransom or reward or otherwise" element	Government: holding Spoon to facilitate theft and to secure escape is an immediate benefit that satisfies “otherwise.”	Defs: they did not hold Spoon for ransom/reward; any monetary benefit came later when items were pawned.	Held: Affirmed — statute’s "otherwise" is broad; confining to enable theft satisfies element.
Sufficiency — interstate commerce/instrumentality nexus	Government: defendants used a vehicle to cross state lines and to travel to/from the crime; motor vehicle is an instrumentality of interstate commerce.	Defs: mere travel across state lines was too attenuated from the kidnapping to invoke federal jurisdiction.	Held: Affirmed — evidence supports use of instrumentality (automobile) in furtherance of offense; interstate nexus met.
Jury question — supplemental definitions of “confined,” “seized,” “abducted”	Government: dictionary definitions accurately convey ordinary meanings and respond to jury request.	Defs: dictionary definitions risked prejudicing or misdirecting jury; Small suggested ordinary common‑sense meaning instead.	Held: Affirmed — court did not plainly err; providing agreed dictionary definitions for undefined statutory terms was permissible and non‑prejudicial.
Evidentiary hearing on Small’s pro se suppression/Brady claims	Government: attorneys declined to pursue hearing; strategic choices by counsel may be waived; ineffective assistance claims better raised on §2255.	Small: district court should have held an evidentiary hearing on his pro se allegations (invalid warrant, beating, Brady).	Held: Affirmed — claims were waived/forfeited as trial management decisions by counsel and ineffective‑assistance issues are generally for collateral review.
Sentencing — procedural and substantive reasonableness (upward variance based on uncharged crimes)	Government: PSR allegations were corroborated by testimony; court correctly found facts by preponderance and articulated §3553(a) reasons for variance.	Defs: reliance on unproven/unreliable PSR allegations; court improperly shifted burden and overweighed allegations.	Held: Affirmed — district court acted within discretion: contested facts supported by testimony or not adequately contradicted; court adequately explained and justified upward variances.

Key Cases Cited

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (governs sufficiency‑of‑the‑evidence review)
Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124 (1936) (interpreting "otherwise" in kidnapping statute broadly)
United States v. Silverman, 889 F.2d 1531 (6th Cir. 1989) (preponderance standard for contested sentencing facts)
United States v. Ballinger, 395 F.3d 1218 (11th Cir. 2005) (motor vehicles as instrumentalities of interstate commerce)
United States v. Cover, 800 F.3d 275 (6th Cir. 2015) (defendant must produce some evidence to place PSR facts in dispute)
New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110 (2000) (counsel’s trial‑management decisions generally effective as waivers)
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) (standard for review of variance from Guidelines)
Holguin‑Hernandez v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 762 (2020) (appellate review of sentencing reasonableness and standard of review)