79 F.4th 844
7th Cir.2023Background
- FBI surveilled Joseph Jones and Edward Schimenti after pro‑ISIS social media posts; initial surveillance yielded no criminal conduct but showed strong ISIS sympathy.
- FBI used undercover agents (“Omar,” “Bilal,” “Omar 2”) and a confidential human source (“Muhamed”) over ~18 months to cultivate contacts with Jones and Schimenti.
- Jones repeatedly shared ISIS propaganda, introduced others to purported travel facilitators, accepted an ISIS flag, and ultimately provided nine cell phones (Jones: 3; Schimenti: 6) to Muhamed, who the defendants believed would use them as IEDs in Syria.
- Indicted for providing material support to ISIS (18 U.S.C. § 2339B); Jones asserted entrapment and the district court instructed the jury on the defense.
- Jury convicted both defendants; district court denied Jones’s Rule 29 motion (acquittal) and both defendants’ Rule 33 motion for a new trial based on post‑trial disclosure that the FBI paid Muhamed a $50,000 bonus and earlier incomplete payment records.
- Seventh Circuit affirmed: jury verdict on entrapment was reasonable (predisposition and inducement); post‑trial payment and incomplete pretrial payment details did not make acquittal probable; protective order limiting some cross‑examination was not an abuse of discretion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether government failed to disprove entrapment beyond a reasonable doubt (Rule 29) | Government: evidence (social media, contacts, sworn grand jury statements, voluntary acts) shows Jones was predisposed and not induced. | Jones: prolonged, repeated government contact and inducement over 18 months overcame his reluctance; thus entrapment as matter of law. | Affirmed. A reasonable jury could find Jones predisposed and not induced; conviction stands. |
| Whether new trial warranted under Rule 33 due to post‑trial $50,000 bonus and inaccurate itemized pretrial payments to informant | Government: $50,000 payment occurred after trial (not newly discovered evidence at trial); no express pretrial agreement to pay; itemized records were cumulative/impeaching and would not probably produce acquittal. | Defendants: late disclosure of planned bonus and incomplete payment details impeach informant credibility and likely would have changed verdict. | Affirmed. District court did not abuse discretion—disclosure shortcomings were not likely to produce acquittal. |
| Whether district court abused discretion by issuing protective order limiting cross‑examination of FBI witnesses | Government: need to protect witness identities, families, and ongoing counterterrorism efforts; limited probative value of requested inquiries. | Defendants: prevented material impeachment about FBI tactics and agent comments that would support entrapment defense. | Affirmed. Court reasonably limited marginal/cumulative impeachment and protected safety/operations; no prejudice shown. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Mayfield, 771 F.3d 417 (7th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (sets framework for entrapment: government must disprove inducement or predisposition beyond a reasonable doubt)
- Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540 (1992) (government inducement can create predisposition; persistent, affirmative solicitation can produce entrapment)
- United States v. Leal, 72 F.4th 262 (7th Cir. 2023) (standard for viewing evidence in light most favorable to government on sufficiency review)
- United States v. Anderson, 55 F.4th 545 (7th Cir. 2022) (factors relevant to predisposition inquiry, including reluctance)
- United States v. Barta, 776 F.3d 931 (7th Cir. 2015) (no per se rule on number/length of contacts for inducement; fact‑specific inquiry)
- United States v. Garcia, 37 F.4th 1294 (7th Cir. 2022) (review of sufficiency where entrapment defense raised)
- United States v. Foy, 50 F.4th 616 (7th Cir. 2022) (standard of review for district court rulings on sufficiency and Rule 33 motions)
- United States v. Ryan, 213 F.3d 347 (7th Cir. 2000) (elements for new trial based on newly discovered evidence)
- Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958) (entrapment as factual question for jury)