64 F.4th 329
D.C. Cir.2023Background
- On Jan. 6, 2021, Fischer, Lang, and Miller were indicted for crimes arising from the Capitol breach, including assault on officers and a count under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2) for "corruptly... obstruct[ing], influenc[ing], or imped[ing]" Congress’s Electoral College certification.
- District court dismissed the § 1512(c)(2) counts, holding (1) subsection (c)(2) must be limited to obstructive acts related to a record, document, or other object (i.e., evidence impairment), and (2) the residual word “otherwise” ties (c)(2) to (c)(1).
- Government appealed. The D.C. Circuit (Judge Pan majority) reversed, holding § 1512(c)(2) unambiguously covers corrupt conduct that obstructs an official proceeding beyond document-related acts.
- The majority emphasized ordinary meaning of “otherwise,” structural reading of § 1512, and precedent treating (c)(2) as a catch-all obstruction clause; it also recognized mens rea (“corruptly”) and “official proceeding” limit prosecutions but did not fix a single definition of “corruptly.”
- Judge Walker concurred in the judgment but would adopt a narrower mens rea: “corruptly” requires intent to procure an unlawful benefit for oneself or another, to avoid overbreadth; Judge Katsas dissented, arguing § 1512(c)(2) should be read as limited to acts that impair the integrity or availability of evidence, invoking canons, history, precedent, and lenity.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Gov’t) | Defendant's Argument (appellees) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scope of §1512(c)(2) actus reus — whether it reaches non‑evidence-related obstructive conduct (e.g., violent attempts to stop Congress) | (c)(2) is a broad catch‑all: "corruptly... obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding" covers all corrupt obstruction not already in (c)(1) | (c)(2) must be read in light of (c)(1); "otherwise" limits (c)(2) to acts similar to (c)(1), i.e., those that impair integrity/availability of evidence | Reversed dismissal: (c)(2) unambiguously reaches corrupt obstruction beyond document/object tampering; (c)(2) is a catch‑all for other corrupt obstructive acts |
| Meaning/scope of "corruptly" mens rea | No need to adopt a novel narrowing; ordinary/established meanings will constrain prosecutions | Require a narrow definition (e.g., intent to procure an unlawful benefit or knowledge of unlawfulness) to avoid vagueness/overbreadth | Majority: did not adopt a single definitional test but held indictments alleged facts sufficient under any plausible formulation; concurrence would require intent to procure an unlawful benefit |
| Whether certification of Electoral College is an "official proceeding" under §1512 | The statutory definition expressly includes "a proceeding before the Congress," so certification qualifies | Argue "proceeding" implies investigations/evidence; certification is not that kind of proceeding | Held: Electoral College certification is an "official proceeding" under the statute |
| Application to Jan. 6 assaultive conduct (charging violent interference with officers under §1512(c)(2)) | Assaultive conduct that corruptly aimed to stop certification falls within (c)(2) | Such assaultive conduct does not involve evidence impairment and falls outside (c)(2) as properly read | Held: the statutory text covers the alleged assaultive obstruction; district court erred to dismiss §1512(c)(2) counts; case remanded for further proceedings |
Key Cases Cited
- Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008) (residual "otherwise" clause interpreted in light of listed examples; residual covers crimes similar in kind to listed examples)
- Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005) ("corruptly" requires consciousness of wrongdoing; jury instruction deficiencies discussed)
- Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528 (2015) (statutory context and placement in Chapter 73 counsel against overbroad readings of obstruction statutes)
- Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249 (1992) (cardinal canon: when statutory language is unambiguous, give ordinary meaning)
- United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593 (1995) (discussion of "corruptly" in obstruction context; Scalia concurrence on improper-benefit formulation)
- Loughrin v. United States, 573 U.S. 351 (2014) (statutory structure—line breaks and numbering—can inform whether clauses have separate meanings)
- Marinello v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1101 (2018) (discussion of "corruptly" as requiring proof of intent to obtain unlawful benefit in tax‑code obstruction context)