United States v. Joseph Ebron
683 F.3d 105
| 5th Cir. | 2012Background
- Ebron was sentenced to death for the murder of Keith Barnes at USP-Beaumont, with a trial in 2009 that proceeded in guilt/innocence, eligibility for death, and sentencing phases.
- Barnes, who cooperated against codefendants in D.C. murders, was murdered at Barnes’s cell after arriving at USP-Beaumont; surveillance footage and inmate testimony described the events.
- Ebron joined a plan led by Mosley, Sherman, and Bacote to murder Barnes; testimony and 404(b) witnesses were used to show motive related to Barnes’s cooperation against Carpenter.
- During deliberations, juror Brittany Johnson was removed for personal bias and conduct; an alternate juror replaced her and the reconstituted jury returned guilty verdicts.
- The district court rejected Ebron’s post-trial motions, including a motion for mistrial and a motion for a new trial based on Bacote’s affidavit; sentencing occurred with death as to Count I and life imprisonment for Count II.
- On appeal, Ebron challenges: (a) Johnson’s dismissal and the jury handling; (b) guilt/innocence evidentiary rulings; (c) prosecutorial misconduct; (d) sentencing-phase errors; and (e) post-trial claims, with the district court’s denial of a new trial affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Juror dismissal and investigation legality | Johnson’s removal tainted the jury and violated rights. | District court erred by interviewing jurors and removing Johnson; no safeguards were adequate. | District court did not abuse discretion; Johnson removal upheld and reconstituted jury properly instructed. |
| Mistrial necessity given deadlock | Deadlock plus Johnson removal warranted a mistrial. | Investigation and alternative juror replacement avoided manifest necessity for mistrial. | No manifest necessity; district court properly denied mistrial motions. |
| Admissibility of Rule 404(b) evidence for motive | 404(b) fights showed Ebron’s motive due to Barnes’s cooperation. | Evidence was prejudicial and misused; abuse of discretion. | Beecum two-step test satisfied; testimony admitted as probative of motive with limiting instructions; not reversible. |
| Substantial planning aggravating factor | District court properly instructed on substantial planning and premeditation. | Ebron had no involvement in planning; factor improperly submitted. | Invalid as to Ebron’s conduct, but harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; death sentence affirmed after reweighing remaining factors. |
| Confrontation and sentencing-phase evidentiary issues | FDPA allows relaxed evidence; certain hearsay and expert tests were properly admitted. | Some sentencing-phase evidence violated Confrontation and admissibility standards. | FDPA relaxed standard applied; challenged evidence deemed admissible under law; no reversal on these grounds. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Edwards, 303 F.3d 606 (5th Cir. 2002) (abuse of discretion standard for juror misconduct investigations and dismissals)
- United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1978) (two-step Beechum analysis for Rule 404(b) admissibility)
- United States v. Diaz, 637 F.3d 592 (5th Cir. 2011) (plain error review and standard for unpreserved errors)
- United States v. Jones, 132 F.3d 232 (5th Cir. 1998) (harmless error approach and aggravating-factor review framework)
- United States v. Virgen-Moreno, 265 F.3d 276 (5th Cir. 2001) (standard for district court discretion and prejudice analysis)