United States v. Joseph Anderson
755 F.3d 782
5th Cir.2014Background
- On Jan 18, 2012 Jeremy Butler robbed a Chase Bank in Dallas; a tracking device led police to a gold Grand Marquis occupied by Butler, Teddy Rogers, and Joseph Anderson; all three fled and were arrested.
- Anderson was tried alone on an indictment charging aiding and abetting bank robbery; he claimed he merely gave Butler a ride and did not know of the robbery plan.
- Anderson was interviewed after arrest, waived Miranda, and made inculpatory statements; he moved to suppress those statements, which the district court denied.
- At trial Rogers (an unindicted passenger) initially waived the Fifth Amendment but then invoked it after consulting counsel and did not testify; Anderson sought to admit Rogers’s interrogation video and other evidence about Butler’s prior conduct and mental state, all excluded by the court.
- The jury convicted Anderson; the PSR classified him as a career offender based on a prior Texas burglary conviction, producing a 210-month sentence; Anderson appealed challenging suppression denial, several evidentiary rulings, prosecutorial remarks, motions for new trial, and the career-offender determination.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Anderson) | Defendant's Argument (Government) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Suppression: voluntariness/Miranda waiver | Statements involuntary due to rough arrest, threats, size/intimidation and false accusations | Waiver was knowing and voluntary; no coercive conduct causally linked to statements; officers gave Miranda; no threats at interview | Affirmed denial of suppression; totality of circumstances show knowing, voluntary waiver and no coercive police conduct |
| Government interference with witness (Rogers) | Government allegedly threatened to indict Rogers to keep him off stand; that chilled his testimony | No record of government threats to Rogers; Rogers declined after consulting counsel and feared incrimination independently | Plain-error review; no substantial interference found—Rogers’ invocation resulted from counsel’s advice, no causal nexus to government action |
| Exclusion of Butler’s prior bank robbery (Rule 406/habit) | Prior solo robbery shows Butler’s pattern and makes it likelier he acted alone; admissible as habit evidence or to support defense of lack of knowledge | Irrelevant and not habit evidence; single prior act insufficient to show regular practice; not probative of Anderson’s state of mind | No abuse of discretion; excluded because not habit evidence and not relevant to Anderson’s knowledge/intention |
| Exclusion of Rogers’s interrogation video | Video would show Rogers’ statements about Butler and corroborate Anderson’s lack of knowledge | Video is hearsay and cumulative; no applicable hearsay exception invoked | Affirmed exclusion: hearsay and cumulative; appellant abandoned hearsay-exception arguments |
| Exclusion of Butler’s interrogation video / photos (mental condition) | Showing Butler’s bizarre/comatose behavior would support theory that Butler acted alone and Anderson lacked knowledge | Video irrelevant or cumulative; limited probative value for Anderson’s intent | No abuse of discretion in excluding this evidence as not sufficiently probative and likely cumulative |
| Prosecutor’s rebuttal remark about Rogers facing life in state court | Comment injected facts not in evidence and prejudiced jury by implying serious criminal association | Comment was invited by defense argument; isolated; jury was instructed to disregard; evidence against Anderson strong | Comment was improper but, under plain-error analysis, was not reversible—jury likely heeded instructions and evidence of guilt was substantial |
| Motions for new trial (newly discovered evidence & Butler competency) | New inmate statements and later finding Butler incompetent warrant new trial | Inmate statements are hearsay/inadmissible; Butler’s later incompetency irrelevant to his state at offense and cumulative | District court did not abuse discretion denying both motions; evidence inadmissible or irrelevant/cumulative |
| Career-offender classification (prior Texas burglary) | §30.02 burglary is divisible; absent specification, conviction cannot be treated as generic burglary | Judicial confession and indictment show Anderson pleaded to entering a dwelling with intent to commit theft—generic burglary elements met | Affirmed: permissible documents show conviction was for generic burglary, qualifying as a crime of violence for U.S.S.G. §4B1.1 |
Key Cases Cited
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (establishes Miranda warnings and waiver standards)
- United States v. Bell, 367 F.3d 452 (5th Cir. 2004) (totality-of-circumstances test for voluntariness of confessions)
- United States v. Bieganowski, 313 F.3d 264 (5th Cir. 2002) (government interference with defense witnesses requires causal nexus)
- Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594 (1984) (limits hearsay exceptions for co-defendant statements)
- United States v. Lowery, 135 F.3d 957 (5th Cir. 1998) (exclusion of evidence relevant to affirmative statutory defenses may require reversal)
- United States v. Wall, 389 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 2004) (standards and prerequisites for new trial based on newly discovered evidence)
- United States v. Garcia, 470 F.3d 1143 (5th Cir. 2006) (career-offender definition and focus on statutory elements of prior convictions)