United States v. Jose Valdovinos, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 14180

Valdovinos, a Mexican national, pleaded guilty in North Carolina (2009) to four counts of selling heroin (Class G felonies) and was sentenced under a plea agreement to 10–12 months’ imprisonment; the Structured Sentencing Act authorized a 16‑month maximum for his offense class and prior record level.
He was removed to Mexico after serving the state sentence and later illegally reentered the U.S.; he pleaded guilty to illegal reentry in federal court under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a).
At federal sentencing, probation recommended a 12‑level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(B) based on a prior "felony drug trafficking offense" (a predicate defined as punishable by >1 year). The enhancement raised his Guidelines range to 27–33 months.
Valdovinos argued his North Carolina conviction was not punishable by >1 year because the binding plea agreement limited the sentence to 12 months once the judge accepted it, so it could not be a § 2L1.2 predicate.
The district court applied the enhancement, concluding the relevant maximum is set by the North Carolina Structured Sentencing Act (16 months for his class/record), not by an individual plea agreement; the Fourth Circuit affirmed.

Issue	Valdovinos' Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Whether a prior NC conviction is a "felony" for U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 when a judicially‑accepted plea agreement limits the sentence to ≤1 year	The plea agreement bound the judge to a 10–12 month term once accepted, so the conviction was not "punishable by >1 year" and is not a predicate felony	The maximum punishment is determined by North Carolina's Structured Sentencing Act (offense class + prior record level), which authorized 16 months, so the conviction is a predicate felony	Affirmed: the Structured Sentencing Act, not an individual plea cap, governs whether the offense was punishable by >1 year; enhancement applies
Whether courts may rely on hypothetical or outside facts (e.g., worst offender) to determine predicate status	(implicit) The conviction should be assessed by its actual effect at time of conviction (i.e., the binding plea)	The court must look to the offender’s offense class and actual criminal history under the State Act, not plea‑imposed actual sentence	Court follows Carachuri and Simmons: use the conviction/offense class + actual record level under state law; plea cap does not change statutory maximum

Carachuri‑Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563 (2010) (for immigration context: a prior conviction qualifies only if the offense of conviction is punishable as a felony, and courts must look to the conviction itself rather than hypothetical conduct)
United States v. Simmons, 649 F.3d 237 (4th Cir. en banc 2011) (North Carolina Structured Sentencing Act sets the maximum punishment for predicate analysis; courts must consider the offender’s actual offense class and record level)
United States v. Edmonds, 679 F.3d 169 (4th Cir. 2012) (qualification of a prior conviction depends on the maximum permitted, not the sentence actually received)
United States v. Harp, 406 F.3d 242 (4th Cir. 2005) (describing prior ‘‘worst‑offender’’ approach later superseded by Simmons)
Rodriguez v. United States, 553 U.S. 377 (2008) (courts may be limited to records of conviction when assessing prior conviction consequences)