893 F.3d 1360
11th Cir.2018Background
- In March 2015 police investigating drug/gun activity encountered Jose Luis Morales outside a Miami Gardens house; officers spoke with Berta Lang at the front door and obtained her verbal and then written consent (in Spanish) to search the home.
- A K-9 alerted in Morales’ bedroom closet; officers found a bag containing two firearms, ammunition, men’s boxers, and a letter addressed to Morales with the house address. Morales was arrested and later confessed at the station after a Miranda waiver.
- Morales was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (possession of a firearm by a convicted felon). He moved to suppress the search and his confession arguing Lang’s consent was involuntary and that he, as a present co-occupant, was deliberately denied an opportunity to refuse consent.
- At the suppression hearing the magistrate judge found the initial entry problematic but concluded Lang’s written consent to search was voluntary and she had common authority over the premises; the district court adopted that recommendation and denied suppression.
- A jury convicted Morales; he stipulated to the felon status and interstate nexus. The PSR applied the Armed Career Criminal Act enhancement (§ 924(e)), producing a Guidelines range of 188–235 months; the court sentenced him to 188 months.
Issues
| Issue | Morales' Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Voluntariness of co-occupant Lang’s consent to search | Lang’s consent was not voluntary (procured after an illegal entry and under pressure) | Consent was voluntary: officers explained right to refuse in Spanish; no coercion or threats; Lang repeatedly said she had "nothing to hide" | Court held Lang’s written consent was voluntary under the totality of circumstances |
| Whether officers had to obtain Morales’ consent as a present co-occupant (Randolph vs. Matlock) | Officers intentionally kept Morales from the door so he couldn’t object; as a present co-occupant his unasked objection would have defeated Lang’s consent | Officers reasonably relied on Lang’s common authority; Morales was not at the door, did not object, and was not removed to prevent objection | Court held Matlock controls: because Morales did not object and was not prevented from participating, Lang’s consent was valid against him |
| Sufficiency of evidence to corroborate Morales’ confession and prove possession | Confession alone insufficient; government failed to show actual/constructive possession (no DNA tie, only presence) | Confession corroborated by bag/guns found in Morales’ bedroom closet, men’s boxers in bag, letter to Morales with address; supports constructive possession | Court held corroborating evidence plus confession supported a reasonable-jury verdict beyond a reasonable doubt |
| Sentencing challenges (Eighth Amendment & substantive reasonableness) | AC C enhancement and resulting lengthy sentence constitute cruel and unusual punishment; sentence substantively unreasonable | Sentencing enhancement for recidivist is permissible; prior-circuit precedent controls; defendant failed to meaningfully brief substantive-reasonableness claim | Court rejected Eighth Amendment challenge and deemed the substantive-reasonableness claim abandoned for lack of developed argument |
Key Cases Cited
- Matlock v. United States, 415 U.S. 164 (co‑occupant’s consent binds absent an objection by a present occupant)
- Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (a physically present co‑occupant’s express refusal defeats another occupant’s consent)
- Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147 (an uncorroborated confession is insufficient; independent corroboration required)
- Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84 (corroborating evidence need only justify a jury inference of a confession’s truth)
- United States v. Perez, 661 F.3d 568 (possession under § 922(g)(1) includes constructive, joint, or sole possession)
- United States v. Spivey, 861 F.3d 1207 (voluntariness and suppression review standards)