19-11896
11th Cir.Mar 13, 2020Background
- Jose Argiz was convicted of five counts of money laundering under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a) after serving as a conduit: strangers deposited funds into his bank accounts and Argiz delivered cash to unknown individuals for $500 per transaction.
- Argiz provided minimal explanation for the arrangement and initially lied to investigators about how he became involved.
- At trial the district court instructed the jury that “knowledge” could be satisfied by actual knowledge or by deliberate ignorance (deliberate avoidance of positive knowledge).
- Argiz requested three theory-of-defense instructions (claiming he was unwitting, lacked requisite knowledge, or was merely foolish/careless) and sought to present diminished-capacity evidence; the court declined the requested instructions as redundant and did not preclude diminished-capacity evidence.
- Argiz rested without presenting diminished-capacity testimony; on appeal he challenged (1) the deliberate-ignorance instruction, (2) the refusal to give his proposed defense instructions, and (3) the court’s alleged denial of an opportunity to present diminished-capacity evidence. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Government) | Defendant's Argument (Argiz) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Validity of deliberate-ignorance jury instruction | Deliberate ignorance is a recognized means to prove knowledge; facts supported giving the instruction | Instruction was improper and prejudicial | Affirmed—instruction proper; facts supported inference Argiz deliberately avoided learning the scheme’s illegality |
| Refusal to give Argiz’s proposed theory-of-defense instructions | Court’s standard guilt/knowledge and deliberate-ignorance instructions adequately covered defense theories | Requested theory-of-defense instructions were required and their refusal was error | Affirmed—no abuse of discretion because the given instructions covered the substance of Argiz’s requested instructions |
| Denial of opportunity to present diminished-capacity evidence | Court did not preclude such evidence and expressly preserved the issue; Argiz chose not to present it | Court prevented or foreclosed presentation of diminished-capacity evidence | Affirmed—no error; court did not deny opportunity and Argiz rested without presenting evidence |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Arias, 984 F.2d 1139 (11th Cir. 1993) (deliberate-ignorance instruction appropriate where facts support inference)
- United States v. Prather, 205 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 2000) (knowledge may be proved by actual knowledge or deliberate ignorance)
- United States v. Hristov, 466 F.3d 949 (11th Cir. 2006) (defining deliberate avoidance as equivalent to knowledge)
- United States v. Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563 (11th Cir. 1991) (deliberate-ignorance standard: awareness of high probability and purposeful avoidance)
- United States v. Stone, 9 F.3d 934 (11th Cir. 1993) (de novo review of challenge to deliberate-ignorance instruction)
- United States v. Lively, 803 F.2d 1124 (11th Cir. 1986) (entitlement to theory-of-defense instruction if any foundation in evidence)
- United States v. Barham, 595 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1979) (no error if given instructions cover defendant’s theory)
- United States v. Alvarado, 838 F.2d 311 (9th Cir. 1987) (articulating deliberate-ignorance instruction standard)
- United States v. Gonzalez, 834 F.3d 1206 (11th Cir. 2016) (instructions as a whole must accurately reflect law and facts)