United States v. Jorge Rodriguez, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 5290

Background

Rodriguez pleaded guilty to illegal reentry after deportation under 8 U.S.C. §1326 and received a 23-month sentence.
The district court applied a 16-level “crime of violence” enhancement under §2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) based on a Texas conviction for sexual assault of a child (Tex. Penal Code §22.011(a)(2)).
Rodriguez objected, arguing the Texas conviction does not fit the enumerated categories “sexual abuse of a minor” or “statutory rape.”
The court overruled the objection, continued sentencing outside the guidelines via a variance, and ultimately imposed 23 months.
On appeal, Rodriguez challenged the enhancement, arguing the state statute is broader than the generic meanings of the enumerated categories; the panel adopted a plain-meaning method to define the generic meanings.
The en banc court affirmed the sentence, adopting a plain-meaning approach to non-common-law offense categories in §2L1.2.
The concurrence and dissents criticize the plain-meaning approach and advocate alternatives (Taylor-based common-law method).

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the district court erred in applying a 16-level enhancement under §2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii).	Rodriguez argues Texas §22.011(a)(2) is broader than the generic meanings of ‘statutory rape’ or ‘sexual abuse of a minor’.	Rodriguez contends the state statute does not fit the generic meanings and age-differential requirements.	Yes, the court holds it was not error to apply the 16-level enhancement.
What is the proper generic meaning of ‘minor’ in ‘sexual abuse of a minor’ and the age of consent for ‘statutory rape’ in §2L1.2?	Rodriguez challenges the majority’s plain-meaning method and argues for a state-law majority view.	The majority adopts a plain-meaning approach to derive generic meanings for non-common-law offenses.	The court adopts a plain-meaning approach: ‘minor’ means under the age of majority (18); age of consent for statutory rape is the state-defined age of consent.
Whether the Texas §22.011(a)(2) elements comport with the generic meanings of ‘sexual abuse of a minor’ and ‘statutory rape.’	Rodriguez argues the Texas elements do not align with the generic meanings.	The Texas statute aligns with the generic meanings under the plain-meaning approach.	The Texas statute’s elements comport with the generic meanings, supporting the 16-level enhancement.
Whether the court’s approach conflicts with Taylor and related prior decisions in applying the Taylor framework.	Dissent argues for Taylor-based majority approach and uniformity.	Majority defends plain-meaning method to achieve uniform application.	Court maintains plain-meaning approach; acknowledges tension with prior circuits.

Key Cases Cited

Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (establishes the categorical approach for undefined offense categories in guidelines/ACCA context)
Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37 (1979) (uniform, contemporary meaning guidance for undefined offenses (broad context))
Nardello, 393 U.S. 286 (1969) (uniform meaning of offenses beyond common-law roots)
Lopez-DeLeon, 513 F.3d 472 (5th Cir. 2008) (defines generic meanings for minor/consent in §2L1.2 context)
Ramirez-Garcia, 646 F.3d 778 (11th Cir. 2011) (plain-meaning approach used for generic meanings of enumerated offenses)
Lopez-Solis, 447 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2006) (non-common-law offense categories defined by dictionary-based meanings)
Zavala-Sustaita, 214 F.3d 601 (5th Cir. 2000) (statutory rape and sexual abuse of a minor context in §2L1.2)
Gomez-Mendez, 486 F.3d 599 (9th Cir. 2007) (statutory rape distinct from common-law offense)
Diaz-Ibarra, 522 F.3d 343 (4th Cir. 2008) (Fourth Circuit applying plain-meaning approach)
Martinez-Carillo, 250 F.3d 1101 (7th Cir. 2001) (dictionary-based generic meaning for ‘minor’/related terms)