United States v. Jorge Nava, 957 F.3d 581

DEA began investigating Nava after a Gulfport, MS traffic stop of an F-150 registered to Nava produced 29 kg of liquid methamphetamine concealed in the gas tank.
Nava later volunteered to be a confidential source, admitted coordinating cocaine distribution, and directed at least two cocaine transactions; agents observed one and intercepted another (5.22 kg) after the courier Ernesto Lara was stopped.
Nava misled agents about Lara’s route while under an informant agreement; post-arrest evidence included Facebook videos of cocaine, cash, and firearms and a jailhouse call linking him to two persons, including activity in Mississippi.
At sentencing the district court attributed the Gulfport meth seizure to Nava as "relevant conduct," applied a two-level §3B1.3 abuse-of-trust enhancement for misleading DEA, and imposed two concurrent 480‑month terms.
On appeal Nava argued (1) the meth seizure was not relevant conduct, (2) the court used an improper preponderance standard instead of beyond‑a‑reasonable‑doubt, and (3) the §3B1.3 adjustment was improper. The Fifth Circuit affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Nava)	Defendant's Argument (Government)	Held
Attribution of Gulfport meth as "relevant conduct"	Only link was that the truck was registered in Nava's name; different drugs and no proven common accomplices or DTO	Temporal proximity, truck purchased days earlier and registered to Nava, similar pickup point (Ciudad Juarez), concealment in vehicles crossing border, jailhouse admission and Facebook evidence support supervisory role	Affirmed: meth may be attributed as part of the same "course of conduct"; district court's factual finding not clearly erroneous (plausible in light of the record)
Standard of proof for relevant‑conduct findings at sentencing	Finding that increased Guidelines range requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt	Sentencing factfinding may be by preponderance so long as sentence is within statutory maximum	Rejected: preponderance standard constitutional here (Watts); Nava's sentence did not exceed statutory maximum
§3B1.3 abuse‑of‑trust enhancement for misleading DEA	Nava did not occupy a position of public or private trust as an informant	Nava abused informant status by misleading agents about Lara’s route, facilitating concealment	Affirmed (practical result): even if erroneous, plain‑error review fails on substantial‑rights prong because Guidelines cap and math mean removal would not have lowered the effective offense level

United States v. Rhine, 583 F.3d 878 (5th Cir. 2009) (broadly defines "same course of conduct"/common scheme in drug cases)
United States v. Ortiz, 613 F.3d 550 (5th Cir. 2010) (limitations on attributing distinct drug offenses as relevant conduct)
United States v. Wall, 180 F.3d 641 (5th Cir. 1999) (distinctive similarities and temporal proximity can support relevant‑conduct attribution)
United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (1997) (preponderance standard permissible for sentencing factfinding that increases Guidelines so long as sentence is within statutory maximum)
Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129 (2009) (four‑prong plain‑error framework)
United States v. Ocana, 204 F.3d 585 (5th Cir. 2000) (factors for course‑of‑conduct analysis include degree of similarity, regularity, and time interval)